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Introduction

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Preliminary words to the present edition

1. The topics of this book are the following: participating in the thought of the southern regions, introducing their networks, becoming a part of this endeavor and remaining true to a trajectory with its strengths and weaknesses. These topics are a way to contribute to the constitution of another intelligentsia, if this can be said without pedantry, ingenuity, or fundamentalism — all of which are problems that permanently beset us.

This voluminous text about peripheral thinking and the thought of the peripheral regions (formulations that are not synonymous in this case) has tried to cover the past centuries of that part of the world whose thought we are barely aware of in South America. Travels and readings have shown me that, to a large extent, the same thing happens in Asia and Africa, Eastern Europe and Oceania. The thought of each of these regions is not very well known, even among themselves and needless to say among others. Perhaps there are a few known authors, but their biographies are better known than their ideas, while those issues that bring us closer together and that we share are very rarely known.

This mutual ignorance has two disastrous consequences: we do not take advantage of what others think in the south and we are not in a position to hold talks, because we know little or nothing about the others. We may not confess it, although our intellectual practice denounces us: the "other souths" are of little interest and do not seem to produce almost anything that is worthy. This is reinforced by the fact that we do not seek what is relevant, nor do others present it to us. This book aims to be a contribution to remedy this lack of knowledge by showing similarities, connections, parallel, networks, etc.…

While talking with Mbuyi Kabunda about the importance of the dialog between the African and South American intelligentsia, the need for regular meetings usually came up, however small they were, among the people of both regions. I give special importance to the networks that articulated intellectuals in various sub-regions, primarily according to their languages. In this regard, I was interested in contributing to the net-creation of the peripheries in two ways: by showing examples of networks that had been reasonably successful and by highlighting a conceptualization that

motivates and facilitates these networks to the extent that we recognize a great amount of meeting points.

2. For this author, participating in the SOLAR networks (Latin American Society of Studies on Latin America and the Caribbean) and, above all, in the FIEALC (International Federation of studies on Latin America and the Caribbean) was the opportunity to get to know Latin Americanists from various locations in the region as well as elsewhere in the world. People from Spain, United States, Germany, and even more interesting countries and regions such as, Israel, Taiwan, Japan and Greece, South Korea, Serbia, Turkey, Russia and the Anglophone Caribbean, as well as a cascade of other places -far beyond Latin Americanism, but toward the African and Asian, Arab and Russian studies- and the participation in academic meetings here and there. These encounters allowed me to expand my contacts, knowledge and to detect possible topics of discussion. It was a process doubly strengthened by others and by me; in fact, a large part of this book emerges from there.

Thus, a specific and somewhat experiential interest on the circulation of the intelligentsia and ideas started to emerge—issues that were already perceived in Chilean exile and the study of South American exiles. However, in this way, these issues acquired larger and even global dimensions, despite the condition of being the "corner of the world" that we feel as Chileans.

I have the conviction that we miss out on 90% of what humanity thinks, though not the 90 per cent of humanity's thought. This is due to the fact that I am also convinced that the ecosystems of the center have been known to be more productive than those in the peripheries, which so often are reduced to importing and reproducing even the least creative ideas. Be that as it may, the intellectuals of several *souths* owe it to ourselves. The curricula of the courses we offer too many times don't do justice to us. The student body that we form (deform?) is being uncritically cut off from their trajectories. The opening-up to the world, which is so necessary, is not a real opening, but blinders that force us to look only at certain places.

The Polish professor Eugeniusz Gorski -one of the most important thinkers in achieving the general hypothesis of this book and whom

I personally got to know after writing it- talked to me regarding his book about the parallels between Latin American thinking and Slavic Europe. He mentioned that that my references to his work were the first he encountered, regardless of the fact that this study had been written and published many years before in Spanish in Mexico.

In New Delhi, during a research trip dedicated to the study of the Indian thought and the impact of the South American thought in that country (and other countries of the Subcontinent), Mr Shyama Prasad Ganguly, from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, invited me to speak in front of his students. There I told them my ideas at that time (2010) on what I perceived as Indian presence in South America and about the South American presence in India, especially in the social-economic sciences and humanities. If I remember correctly, in that opportunity the names of José Vasconcelos, Gabriela Mistral and Victoria Ocampo came up, as well as the names of Tagore, Gandhi, Prebisch, Cardoso and Faletto, among many others. I don't think I spoke of Vandana Shiva nor Gayatri Spivak, whose importance in our region was not then sufficiently perceived. These two Indias, which were subsequently cited a great amount, showed little of their importance and this change was an example of how the readings of figures from other regions are reversed, although in an exceptional and partial manner.

In the text arisen from his participation in a colloquium in Dakar, Leopoldo Zea stated: Negritude and indigeneity have their origin in the common awareness of dependence on those who have made flags of liberation and decolonization. A horizontal relationship, a relationship of solidarity among equals and peers among peers, must be opposed to the vertical relationship between men and between peoples -the dependency relationship of master and slave, of dominator and dominated, colonizer and colonized.

There in Dakar, in a meeting organized by Leopold Senghor, this South American author tried to link the concerns of the intelligentsia of both regions in order to bring about communication among them. They were great attempts but modest achievements that didn't reach enough density to stand tall.

3. The main thesis of this study is that in regions affected by European expansion and its power, and during the last centuries, there was a reaction that led to two alternative

formulations that are in permanent discussion: those who imagined that the best solution for their societies was to take as much as possible from the knowledge of the center (Centralitarian) and those who imagined that, on the other hand, it was necessary to deepen their own identity and find solutions to new challenges (Identitarian). In both cases, the reference was the center: to be like the center versus being ourselves, thus differentiating ourselves from the center. Because of this permanent reference to the center, I define this reference as "peripheral thinking as such." This does not exhaust, on the other hand, expressions of thought in the south, so I have preferred to call this "the thought of the peripheries or thought of the South."

On the other hand, this thesis aims to synthesize what those who have dealt with the various eidetic expressions of the South during the last centuries have formulated; they aim to achieve this by developing a formulation as comprehensive as possible, which also allows similarities and differences to be understood. In the broad *introduction* of the volume, the main formulations that have been systematized to express the eidetic trajectory in those societies are acknowledged.

4. When speaking of "eidetic studies" varied expressions of those who have an interest in the studies of ideas are grouped, as well as the intellectuals who hold these ideas and their relations with the societies with which they come in symbiosis, whether in a historical perspective or a present one, in a basic or applied perspective, in a perspective more related to the content of ideas or in whom these are expressed.

Epistemically, I like the notion of "meeting points," which allow us to understand a disciplinary area as an encounter among the lines of work or approaches that intersect at some points. These points constitute a disciplinary field that groups these expressions as well as the community of those of us dedicated to these issues. They thereby promote the maturation of a language as well and, in this process, develop a proposal that fertilizes the endeavor instead of inhibiting. it. In addition, it correspondingly offers a certain status of professionalization by elevating the level of the discussions and bringing it out of the level of "opinions."

When constructing a discipline, it is crucial to separate eidetic studies from their affinity with historiography. Eidetic studies may be performed, among other ways, as studies of intellectual history or the history of ideas themselves. They can also be performed as studies of sociology of knowledge or in other forms but, in no case, should they be assumed as a branch of historiography. Eidetic studies constitute a distinct discipline that, as in so many cases, establishes partnerships with others in order to better explore a problem. But eidetic studies are not necessarily obliged to a diachronic point of view; they could also have a synchronous point of view. These approaches are better developed in a book on the life of ideas, which I prepared in collaboration with Dr. Andrés Kozel.

5. This book was written in 2012 and was published in virtual media as a professor of the Institute of Advanced Studies of the University of Santiago de Chile (IDEA). In 2014 the Latin American Council of Social Sciences, CLACSO took the book to its virtual platform, thus making it a participant on its list of publications. Now, in 2017, the volume has been subjected to a review with the participation of Dr. Manuel Loyola, whom I thank for his work.

This work has given rise to various reactions, although I think that, in general, it has been a little known topic. I hope that the current version planned for different platforms in open access allows for a wider dissemination and reading. I would like to thank Dr. Cesar Ross for his suggestions that he gave for the drafting of these preliminary words during long discussions which we held during a trip to Japan's capital.

Tokyo, June 2017

Preface (2012)

This book has intended to become a kind of history of the thought of the regions which have assumed themselves as intellectually peripheral in the last 300 years. It was intended to be that, but it is not. It had to settle, through the successive "restructuring" it has been subjected to, for being the presentation and defense of the following hypothesis: **The most comprehensive way to understand the thought which has emerged in peripheral regions during the last centuries—regions generally subjected to processes of invasion or colonization—involves the choice of *being-like-the-center versus being-ourselves*. This problem has been brought up by the Latin American, African, and Asian intelligentsia, as well as the Slavonic, the Balkan and Iberian intelligentsia of this era.** As a result, this book decided to limit itself to showing the multiple strokes that contribute to the testing of this hypothesis, as will be seen later.

This book is meant to be an articulation and improvement of my previous works on Latin American, African and Asian thinking. At the same time, it seeks to present both the circulation of ideas and the "spontaneous appearance" of the same type of thought -in various parts of the world- which is a thought powered by the "peripheral" dilemma. This book has to settle for being the union of previous works with large aggregates about Islamic regions, the Far East, the Indian Subcontinent, as well as Eurasian and Slavic world. It has also gone back to the 19th century, and even in some regions, to the 18th. Eventually, it decided to be the presentation of the greatest thesis ever attempted on the thinking of peripheral regions; that is to say, it has had to be presented as what I wouldn't have liked it to be initially: a mere synthesis of previous works. Even the much or little that has been used has had to be cut and reformulated (sometimes) in order to comply with the balance of architecture that this new study had demanded among other types of demands, such as renouncing what would have been easier: bringing together my work on Latin American thinking with my work on Sub-Saharan thinking and adding, here and there, a few accessories to give a feeling of completeness. However, how do you renounce everything that has been thought in the last few centuries within Jadismo and, more broadly, in Islamic revivalism? How do you renounce Pan-Asianism and Eurasianism? And how do you renounce discerning the ways in which some of these schools are peeking into the twenty-first century? It is likely that we can achieve that by partially repeating the ways in which the peripheral intelligentsia has always

looked at things, and trying to, on the other hand, emancipate ourselves from a straitjacket that has kept its hands tied for so long.

Long-term trade has also been accepted, for which a playing field for the long shot and high shot has been set—a place where there are no concessions to provincialism or epochism, but rather a place where the small manias of the smug villager are overcome from the beginning. Because, when it comes to being smug, it seems to be best done from a position that assumes the large dimensions of the world and history. For if we are to settle for something, it is best to settle for the big rather than the small, and the generous rather than the petty.

This book has two objectives: the first is to characterize a type of thinking that has appeared in different regions of the world, especially in the colonized areas through modernity; the second objective is to point out the limitations, possibilities and paths this genre of thought has to overcome. These two objectives are reflected in a third objective that refers to the location of meeting points, which allow a dialog and meeting with the current peripheral intelligentsia in order for them to recognize each other as such and be able to perform a self-criticism that will give them a boost. These goals are broken down into multiple subordinated objectives. These three objectives are performed through teaching and by offering students of the peripheral regions reference points so they can place themselves within a map of global eidetic cartography—a map that was produced precisely from the peripheries.

This is an eidetic studies book and as such it's about other people's thinking and not its own. However, and I say this with some sense of guilt and shame, I couldn't help but propose some ideas on the basis of reflecting on the thought limitations and possibilities that I have worked on for so many years. Inspired by the work of *the* Leopoldo Zea, in which he tried to relate Latin American ideas with other peripheries, I wanted to continue this task and add evidence to what master Zea only implied. This inspiration grew when encountering the very suggestive work of the Polish author Eugeniusz Gorski, who showed multiple similarities between Latin America thought and Eastern Europe's thought. Gorski said: "We use the adjective peripheral in the descriptive and not the evaluative sense. Accordingly, we note the profound meaning in the philosophical thinking on the periphery, and especially in the effort to think precisely from the point of view of the periphery" (1994, 10). Later he delimited: "In general terms, the history of Hispano-American philosophy is similar to that of Eastern Europe" (1984, 23). The rest was to universalize the project

by defining the specific theoretical frameworks and, above all, to move forward in the immense and often discouraging evidence.

We want, first of all, to show that in the last centuries the intellectuals from Latin America, Asia and African regions, and even the intelligentsia of semi-peripheral regions, have thought in quite a similar way and that the distinction between western and eastern or between animists and Christians is almost irrelevant for this effect. This book tries to illustrate, beyond that, that a "peripheral sensitivity" and a "peripheral thinking" appears and it engages these intellectuals over the established traditional differences.

We want to explain how this sensitivity appears and how it develops. We also want to discuss the superficial approach that is believed to be a phenomenon that has to do with post-modernity or, at best, a consequence of colonialism itself. This is not the case, although colonialism made it easier. This sensitivity probably arose in America (Peru or Mexico), Russia and Spain and it was expressed a little later during the 18th century, although the last two countries were not colonized regions. It should be noted that European expansion and the subsequent colonial expansion allowed a lot of people to see and feel the power of Western Europe; it also allowed them to feel the radical relativization of their spontaneous notion of being the center of the world. However, it wasn't enough. The maturity of an intelligentsia was also necessary so that this sensitivity and this thought could be generated. Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean encountered European expansion in the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century. However, only at the end of the 18th century, and, above all, in the nineteenth century, was there a massive joining of the group by those who possessed this sensitivity and this peripheral thinking. In order to reach this sensitivity, a certain level or density was needed. The intelligentsia needed to able to see beyond their region and have a more or less secularized mentality (that is, they would not attempt to explain events through supernatural or magical forces) and, above all, they needed to abandon the idea that culture was completely sacred and that it was located at the center of the world. Whatever the case, the problem of identity and the reference to the center has been key to the peripheral intelligentsia since the beginning of the 18th century and a bit before. This has by no means been a problem or a trend in recent decades as the intelligentsia of the center thinks it is. This is due to the fact that for the center's intelligentsia, the peripheral one has become a problem, but only during this era. To the center's intelligentsia this has become a

problem, especially within their own societies because of the overwhelming presence of immigration. For the peripheral intelligentsia this was and still is mainly a matter, if you will, of international relations or, better put, location and meaning in the global space. For example, Burhan Ghalioun (2001) claims in regard to Muslim societies that, until the beginning of the 19th century, religion dominated them completely. In addition, the spiritual and religious life of Islam in the strict sense depended upon the constitution of all the elements necessary for a social organization: institutional frameworks, concepts and values. At the head of the religious institution, the *ulema* constituted the main component of the political elite. The *ulema* were involved in the formalization of the body of the State in the fields that form the structure of a State — that is, the management of the sacred, teaching, education and jurisprudence. However, despite this, the sheikhs of the mystical orders, the true State within the state, ruled over vast underground networks, reaching deep into the spirit of these societies. The entire social construction, both in its moral foundations as well as in its institutions, rested on a religion or was soaked in its atmosphere. But then comes the moment of truth: Taken by assault by modernity, this secular, exhausted and frozen construction didn't even have time to renew itself. Starting in the late 18th century, it will begin to crack under the dual impact with the economic expansion of competitive capitalism and the political-military expansion of the conquering Europe.

Addressing this matter refers us to another problem: when taking a closer look, the appearance of a peripheral intelligentsia is perceived — an intelligentsia that recognizes itself and generates a certain solidarity. This intelligentsia (without substance, since it is not marked by some permanent seal or a radically distinctive label, it does not come from completely determinate regions, languages or times and it does not possess either a mission in the future of any absolute spirit) perceives some self-awareness and studying it is of the utmost importance.

The networks this book deals with are from people who inquire about the reality of their people in the world and their fate. It is mainly about people who produce ideas as interpretations and proposals for their realities and not just information, as empirical knowledge about these realities. Peripheral thinking emerges and expresses a concern for the fate of individuals and societies; it doesn't unfold in the fields of scientific endeavors, but rather in those that try to connect knowledge with the construction of projects.

Proposing these research problems, I have been mentioning implies having been emancipated from the national paradigm that, in many opportunities, drowns its own intelligentsia in the peripheral regions. The question is: how do ideas work? How do they work in their internal dynamics, as systems-of-ideas? How do they operate, mutate, intersect, evolve and multiply? And regarding their external dynamics, how do they circulate and compete for spaces? The question regarding the functioning of ideas acquires all its strength to the extent it is assumed that human beings are increasingly governed by ideas and not by instincts. I'm not saying this in the idealistic sense, imagining that human beings would be well-intentioned spirits, or even less that our behaviors would be guided by providential forces that lead us toward a happy ending. Putting it in a more prosaic and simpler manner: we are mediated by ideologies, discourses, visions of the world, paradigms, religions and cultural patterns. And if we accept said "Pan-eidetism," we will understand that engineers, journalists, preachers, researchers, philosophers, politicians and many other guilds are producers of ideas. To put it in an even more energetic manner: the interests, actions, consensus, projects and the decisions of human beings cannot be understood without world views, expectations, fantasies and placebos that, in turn, can only be understood, or formulated, conducted and transmitted as ideas. This is not to say that disputes are restricted to ideas; there are also fists and canyons, among other ways. But, in general, interests aren't assumed instinctively—they are assumed through the corpus of ideas. In this regard, the study of ideas is key for the study of the global movements of everything (or almost everything) that is not an idea: people, goods, capitals and other things.

The architecture of this book had to reconcile many things: it should be sufficiently comprehensive and inclusive in order to prove a thesis and to allow for a comparison among various regions during a sufficiently long period. At the same time, it had to be sufficiently short so as not to become an encyclopedia. It should widely seize the information found on the web and, at the same time, it should upload a huge amount of information to the web that would make this book lighter. It was with this objective that the **Atlas del Pensamiento** was designed (www.umbral.uprrp). Sufficient levels of erudition had to be achieved, but without trying to become a specialist in tongues while resisting the temptation to use words, or less phonetic signs or spelling errors, that readers could never understand. In a sense, the architecture was a matter of balances, but it would be simplistic to say that it is a balanced work.

How does one read this book? The General Introduction presents a summary. The body of the work is composed of 6 chapters that are intended to cover 3 centuries of history, each giving an account of the intellectual environments of the peripheries. Each chapter covers 6 or 7 geo-cultural environments that have become peripheral eidetic ecosystems. These ecosystems are presented through numerous sections, each of which starts with a few lines in bold where the thesis that will be developed in it is set forth. The chapters are closed with an overall conclusion where I summarize the meeting points that allow each other to be recognized and discussed with the intelligentsia of the peripheries: networks, sensitivity, awareness, and evolution of the peripheral dilemma, as well as the most important thinking motives in these regions. The book almost closes with an epilogue that is sort of philosophical, sort of essayistic and sort of historiographical. It's an epilogue responsible for assessing this thinking, aiming to the objective of good thinking. At the end of the book, a bibliography of cited texts is incorporated, as well as an annex with some of the eidetic cartographies. In addition, throughout the book, about 100 notes of erudition are included, where information is expanded upon, links among authors and regions are displayed, and recommendations for research leads are given. These notes are relatively long, and I would have thought they would be of much interest for those who are concerned professionally and learnedly in these matters. They do not have, however, a lot of relevance for those who simply want to grasp the core of the approach.

This work has been thought out, first of all, as a text for teaching. It is a text that allow students—particularly in the peripheral regions—to know how people have thought in other regions of the South and how ideas have circulated horizontally among their region and others. It also allows them to learn how to locate meeting points for a dialog with the intellectuals of other peripheral regions and, in this context, students should also adopt relating specificities. Overcoming intellectual provincialism has been the most persistent leitmotiv of this book. We know that peripheral intellectuals are reciprocally unknown to each other and take as specific some elements that are actually spreading nearly through the entire globe in modern times. Overcoming these provincialisms makes it possible to think about the periphery as a whole.

Is it necessary to read the book completely? If you have already read the **index** and this **preface**, you have a first idea regarding the intention of this research, but little or nothing of the

content. If you read the **General Introduction**, you will have a very abridged, although quite complete view of the whole work. **The General Introduction** contains a minimum collection of evidence, but has the structure, hypotheses, concepts, and almost everything you need to manage the key ideas. It is not a brief introduction, because it attempts to synthetically present a large proportion of the book. If you are or want to be a specialist in eidetic studies, you couldn't settle with less than reading, in addition to the above, a large part of the chapters of the content and the final synthesis. These will give you a map of the world thinking, as seen from the peripheral regions in the last three centuries. In a way, it will be like a map of the world before and after the trip of Sebastian Elcano. You will learn about almost all of the world, but only through its coasts. If you intend to be a learned person or scholar in the process of being a learned person, of those who manage over 3000 authors (that is to say, your hard disk has stored some information about the biographies and works of some 3000 people who thought about something) then, the many notes and the few maps that are included here will be very useful and perhaps they may even delight you. It will be like walking into roads and rivers, but also through the most scabrous territories in the continents of thought. In addition, in the notes and cartographies, you will find a number of categories and methodological principles are barely mentioned in the **General Introduction** but are somehow put into play in the chapters. But above all, these categories and principles are worked and exploited in the notes and in some of the cartographies attached. These must be observed patiently. Some are simple, as they relate to small territories and display just a few points (I understand a "point" to be a person, an institution or a school of thought), while others exceed 50 points.

It has been very difficult for me to design the cartographies. Today, world maps seem almost obvious with their four cardinal points, scales, parallels and meridians. But to those who know the backwards maps of the 15th century, it will be clear how much it takes to build them conceptually, outside of the information needed to fill them in. Conceiving these eidetic cartographies has been a whole process. It was particularly difficult to incorporate the time variable, which is key here. Lastly, if you fall under the category of an obsessive person, you will be able to delve into almost all of proper names, schools of thought, institutions and relations between one and the others digging into the *Atlas del Pensamiento* and in the innumerable links that you'll find there, if you have a long enough life to do so.

Why make this book? For two reasons: first, to reach a place where no one has ever reached before; the second, to contribute something, so some societies can be emancipated from their peripheral condition.

I understand books are read in different ways, according to the conditions, interests or perspectives of those who read them. I would like that when people read this book, they take into account the fact that it intended to deliver items to facilitate a dialog among the various peripheral regions in order to make the creation and empowerment of intellectual networks more feasible. These intellectual networks would allow ideas to circulate fluently and, at the same time, they would allow a greater empowerment of intellectuals so they can speak their voices in the global space. It's an attempt to lay some conditions so peripheral intellectuals can talk about themselves and the fate of their peoples —an attempt so they can (at least some of them) benefit from what others have produced and, above all, can assume themselves as parts of a whole.

We have tried to develop a more generous speech that allows for inclusion rather than disqualification, collaboration rather than competition, and capitalization rather than resorting to waste. This speech intends to build rather than to criticize; it also aims to renew and encourage the confluence of lines of thought that have been (perhaps) depleted, but which represented important historical moments. Lastly, it's a speech that the peripheral world intellectuals can remember and capitalize in order to think better.

In other words, I have wanted to develop a speech that has, in a sense, a character of "minimum common" that allows the speeches of the different peripheries to be remitted (not reduce) to a shared land and, consequently—because some speeches are more listened to than others—to be a contribution that allows the intelligentsia of the peripheries to express themselves better, and to generate a common action (collaboration) so we may overcome the periphery condition, thus allowing us to move toward a world where power is more evenly widespread.

National Library of Peru; the Center for African Studies, Mahler, the University of Paris I (France); the Center for Afro-Asian Studies, Universidade Cândido Mendes, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil); the Center for Advanced Studies in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean, San Juan in Puerto Rico; CODESRIA, Dakar (Senegal); IDEP, Dakar (Senegal); the College of Mexico; the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC, Santiago (Chile); the Institute of Higher Studies in Latin America, the University of Paris III, (France); the Higher Institute of Philosophy, the University of Louvain (Belgium); the Higher Institute for Labor Sciences and Business, Africa Section, Lisbon (Portugal); the Institute of Ibero-American Cooperation, Madrid (Spain); the Institute of Latin American Studies, Berlin (Germany); the Institute of Latin American Studies, Academy of Sciences, Moscow (Russia); the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (USA); the Jawaharlal Nehru Museum, New Delhi (India); the Autonomous University of Mexico State; the Autonomous University of Madrid (Spain); the University of Buenos Aires (Argentina); the Catholic University of Paraguay; the Central University of Venezuela; the University of Costa Rica; the University Cheikh Anta Diop (Senegal); the University of São Paulo, Franca (Brazil); the Federal University Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre (Brazil); Universidade Federal Fluminense, Niterói (Brazil); University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain); University of Leuven (Belgium); Mayor University of San Andrés, La Paz (Bolivia); the National Autonomous University of Mexico; the National University, in Heredia and Brunca, (Costa Rica); the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua, Managua; the National University of Cuyo (Argentina); The National University of Central Buenos Aires (Argentina); the National University of Mar del Plata (Argentina); the University of Puerto Rico in Rio Piedras; the University of Puerto Rico in Arecibo; The Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi (India); the University of Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic); the University of Sao Paulo (Brazil); the University of Talca (Chile); Tel Aviv University (Israel); the Unisinos University, Sao Leopoldo (Brazil); the University of Valencia (Spain); and the University of West Indies, Port of Spain (Trinidad - Tobago).

General Introduction

1. Presentation

Eidetic studies have been expanding and renewing everywhere, including in Latin America. One of the most important matters in this regard has been the ability to encompass the whole of reality as an object of study, going far beyond the borders of their initial inspiration, which was to study ideas taken only as philosophical ideas. This "Pan-eidetic" look ventures to build national, continental or global versions by taking on ideas as axes, but without aspiring, on the other hand, to a sort of exclusivity or monopoly, which would prevent looking at reality from other dimensions. An overarching perspective could also be taken from the economic reality or communications, among other possibilities.

In a sense, if it can be said as such, this approach inherits the contributions of Leopoldo Zea and Raul Prebisch in their explicit aspiration to understand the functioning of the world and of history, by understanding them both globally from Latin America, the Caribbean and from the peripheral regions, within a network of intellectual and social relations that wish to move forward in the constitution of a global intelligentsia, which really encompass peripheral intellectuals as agents. However, how do you think with them, while at the same time not wanting to go beyond? This intellectual project, heir of 'Third Worldism," is imagined after the failure of that formula, without attempting to disassociate itself, on the other hand, from its legacies. In other words, it is a matter of thinking about the totality of the peripheries in a global way and thinking about the peripheral condition, so it ceases to be periphery.

It has already been pointed out that the goals of this book are two: the first is to characterize a type of thinking that has been present in regions which assume themselves as peripheries of the world through modernity; the second is to point out the limitations, possibilities and ways of overcoming this type of thinking. These two objectives are reflected in a third one, which refers to the location of "meeting points" that enable dialogs and the meeting of the current peripheral intelligentsia, that they recognize each other as such, and they could be able to perform a self-critique that boosts them. These goals are broken down into subordinate objectives.

The **first major objective** is broken down into 3 parts:

1. To determine and present the main trends within which this genre of thought emerged and was formed, thereby intending to create a typology with its periods and key milestones in what may be called a process of "maturation," and intending to state something about the reasons that converged in those changes.
2. To determine what the most important "peripheral motives" are, and to point out whose authors have highlighted them.
3. To determine which were the instances in which there were meetings and contacts among peripheral intellectuals that have contributed to the circulation of ideas.

The **second major objective** is broken down into 2 parts:

1. To determine the limitations or weaknesses that have manifested in the history of peripheral thinking.
2. To determine the strengths and possibilities of overcoming such thinking in the perspective of advancing toward the overcoming of the peripheral condition.

The third objective, concerning meeting points, is aimed at intellectual networks, the development of a certain common awareness, the repeated "motives" within peripheral thinking and the performing of a critique and self-critique regarding this type of thought. Lastly, this objective aims to seek out paths where intellectuals make their own way.

Now, the scale of the objectives should not lead one to think of this work as a universal history of ideas in recent centuries, but rather solely as the route through enough moments in each intellectual environment of the peripheral regions to identify the data that supports the proposed hypotheses.

The most important **hypotheses** that will be presented and defended throughout this work are the following:

1. The most comprehensive way to understand the thought produced during the last centuries in peripheral regions, that are often (though not always) subjected to processes of invasion or colonization, is formulated on the basis of the

dilemma be-like-the-center versus being-ourselves.

2. This quandary works as sense-giving to several other dilemmas that are articulated around it in different and complex ways, and that even at times, tarnish it or displace it[1].

3. This quandary appears, on many occasions, through spontaneous generation within intellectuals of these regions, after having suffered the impact of the center.

2. Problem Statement: Toward a definition of the dilemma that constitutes peripheral thinking.

It's about developing a general theory of thought in peripheral regions (of the intellectuals who assumes themselves as peripheral) in recent centuries. Correspondingly, a theory about peripheral thought refers to an interpretation (and to a theory) on the peripheral regions and global history or, at least, casts on our shoulders the need to understand the development of the global history of modernity since the peripheral condition is one of the faces of modernity. In that respect, this book tries, to some extent, to take charge of the periphery of the world, which is a large part of the world.

It is understood by peripheral thinking the one that meets the following conditions:

a. It is articulated within a society in relation to (as a reference point) the form of existence of another society, contemporary

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[1] **The peripheral dilemma is articulated**, among other things, with the following: colonialism/independence, imperialism/independence, black/white, poor/rich, exploiter/exploited, machismo or patriarchy/female emancipation, countryside/city, industry/agriculture, development/underdevelopment, development/dependence, dependence/liberation, barbarism/civilization, progress/backwardness, dictatorship/democracy, worker/capitalist. This is seen more clearly in dilemmas such as the following: urban/rural, Catholicism/masonry, Protestantism/Catholicism, socialism/liberalism, free trade/protectionism, religion/free-thinking. There are others that are almost synonymous with the peripheral dilemma: foreignism/nationalism, frenchified/national, authenticity/alienation, Occidentalism/autochthonism, modern/traditional. However, these carry a contemptuous look regarding one of the parties, according to the preferences of those who have proposed them.

and not preterit, trying to imitate it, or differentiate from it.

b. Is constituted from a basic tension between the imitative proposal of being-like-the-center and the differentiating identity of being-ourselves. The first is about raising the need for improvement of the society itself through the formula of reaching/imitating and capitalizing the contributions of the model society, through science and technology and by opening themselves to the progress of it and trying to break away from indigenous life forms. On the other hand, there is the differentiating proposal, which states the need to deepen one's own identity and search for formulas that are inspired by it, either to defend themselves against shocks and/or to overcome the limitations of the center.

c. It aims at the interpretation and "structural" transformation of one way of existence or a society.

d. It appears in the modern era, more precisely during the 18th century, although it has proto-demonstrations and, by the way, several backgrounds.

e. It is articulated on the basis of a series of "motives," which are sorted according to the poles: to be like the center/be ourselves.

This work is an exhibition of the constitution and development of this genre of thought based on the displaying of connections and parallels that allow, in turn, the existence of networks and flow of ideas primarily among the regions of the South to be shown. The dilemma of the peripheral thinking be-like-the-center versus be-ourselves is the key to understanding this way of thinking. This dilemma expresses the basic polarity in which the thinking of the peripheral regions from the 18th century is put at stake, although there is some background. This formulation has a comprehensive claim with respect to other formulations that have been used to understand these thoughts. By comprehensive I am referring to three things:

a. That is the most frequent at the level of ideas; more frequent than others, such as the opposition between political unitarianism and federalism; among more or less planned economies; between more libertarian positions or more state dependent; between protectionist positions or free traders, between cultural proposals that can be more secular proposals or more religious, etc. They are disjunctives that, moreover, lack a peripheral specificity.

b. Comprehensive also means that it gives meaning to other eidetic quandaries, in which it underlies without being explicitly displayed;

c. That it is necessary, that is to say, that it appears in all the peripheral regions, when a distinct intelligentsia from the traditional intelligentsia appears, understood as located in the center of the world. This "new" intelligentsia, able to look beyond their own culture and society, wakes up with a surprise or perplexity as to what the center is: the power, beauty, the difference in their productions. This surprise, puzzlement or amazement which is typically crystallized in something like a feeling of an (more than complex) inferiority complex. This complexity results in two reactions: fascination or rejection, each of which are expressed conceptually: the fascination as the wager that it is possible and desirable to be like the center, and the rejection, that it is impossible and undesirable to be as the center.

The first: be-like-the-center is the centralitarian proposal. It is assumed as a task of imitation, which is almost always a trait of westernization. It seeks to adapt itself to the spirit of the times or to "catch-up"; it aims to overcome the differences that it sees as negativities and therefore it is developed as a denial of indigenous-peasant-popular culture. It exalts, on the other hand, science and technology; it often proposes to open up to the culture and people of the center (not necessarily to their capitals nor to its armed invasions) to receive inspiration from there; it is almost always a proposal of "modernization" that aims to take the advances of the Center, particularly its scientific and technological capacity, although there are some exceptions in intellectuals who aspire to be-like-the-center but not in the technological dimension, but in a spiritual or cultural assimilation or imitation. An example of this is the Yoruba Samuel Crowther, in the mid-19th century, who postulated the need to assume the Anglican-Victorian culture and religion, without making allusions to technology, to steam, or to rail, nor to science or democracy. Something similar happens with the Hispanics or Iberians as José Vasconcelos and José de la Riva Agüero, already elderly, and the not so old Carlos Ibarguren and Plinio Salgado, Latin American people of the years 1930 and 1940, claiming the recovery of the Iberian, as well as the medieval and the catholic.

The second proposal: Be-ourselves is the "identitarian" proposal. It accepts the difference and wants to delve into the

elements that make this difference, enhancing some of the forces present there to be carried out in the future; it exalts the culture, particularly of those who have assimilated the center less than others, those who remain unpolluted; it promotes, as a result, closing to influences conceived as suspicious, if not downright dangerous or harmful. This proposal is not perceived as an adaptation to the world, but if it is, it must be precisely from the difference and from the possibility to provide what the center does not have.

What makes them both proposals of "peripheral" thinking is the fact that they are incomprehensible without the reference to the "center." This novelty unsettles, upsets or obsoletes the old oppositions that traditional intelligentsias managed: believers versus cafire, we-center-in-the-world versus the others; complete and civilized humans versus barbarians; chosen-from-the-gods versus non-chosen. In this sense, the peripheral dilemma, Centralitarism versus Identitarism is connected, but it doesn't identify with quandaries such as universalism and particularism; or the other between rationalism and romanticism (Illustration). The peripheral dilemma represents, in some way, these oppositions, but it is not reduced to them, and is not reduced precisely because it acquires meaning only by its reference to the center: The peripheral "universalism" is not referred to an abstract or utopian model, but to a model (or models) of the center; and the peripheral particularism is normally defined as the difference with respect to the pattern(s) of the center. To understand this, we should not think in a sort of essential center, eternal and immutable, but in the image of a center in the imagery of the intelligentsia that are perceived or assume themselves -because of sensibility and thought- as peripheral.

The peripheral dilemma is not a discussion in which only members of the native intelligentsia can mediate. Voices and intellectuals from the central powers that play a role in that discussion frequently appear, either as participants or as referents. This has a lot to do with the speech of the center on the periphery.

On the other hand, not all of the native intelligentsia immediately assumes the dilemma of the periphery. This is a long process that takes decades or even centuries to understand. There is a part that has assumed European expansion, that is aware of this phenomenon and that, acting accordingly, generates the dilemma of being like the center versus being ourselves. The other possibility, which remains closed to the existence of the center, continues exclusively thinking in terms of their society, without assuming or reacting to the presence of the center. The Al-Azhar University in Cairo is probably the most denounced case by an intelligentsia

desirous of renewal. This university is a sort of redoubt of those who did not want to hear of the new world in which they lived.

The conception of the world as a system in which they are no longer the center, but one of the parties, and even a small part of the periphery, is key in this change of sensibility. This is the modernity of the periphery. It is assuming the peripheral condition, the "peripherality," something it doesn't have to respond to an economic-political-military (or "real") peripherality, but that is enough with the (subjective) conviction of its intelligentsia. Being modern is becoming part of the periphery and conceiving modernity as peripherality. This change in perspective has almost always been accompanied by the ability to speak a western language in addition to a mother tongue, or nonwestern language, but that allows a more direct access to the culture of the center (the case of the Japanese language for the Chinese and the case of the Russian language for the Tatars toward 1900). It is true that the assumption of this condition is associated, in many opportunities, with certain "secularization" or the "adoption of a rational thought," etc., but this is partial, as it is in the center. However, the adoption of rational thought does not have to manifest itself in all dimensions of life or society. We already know that a certain degree of "modern" behavior is enough to operate in modernity, and that it is possible to maintain broad areas of people's lives embedded in modernity inside a magical mentality. The modern condition can coexist with the belonging to a "magic" world, in the sense that the peripheral condition can be conceived as a divine punishment for committed faults and, therefore, the fight against the peripheral condition will be, at the same time, the struggle for redemption before that vindictive divinity.

This interpretation of peripheral thought as tension between Identitarism versus Centralitarism, can be read as a structuralist heritage and, in truth, the search for a basic opposition that accounts for such a large portion of the thought that it can point in that direction. However, if taken as such, then take it only in a light way. In no case is it about hard structuralism that would pretend to give full account of the thinking generated in the peripheral regions, but only of the predominant or more inclusive matter. Moreover, the theory that attempts to explain the functioning of peripheral thinking has some resemblance to the theory of universal gravitation. It explains the existence of two movements of opposite signs that are formed in tension and in balance. It is similar to the theory that explains why an apple falls and a balloon rises and why the moon and the antipodes don't "fall."

3. Issues relating to eidetic studies (of ideas)

The development of eidetic studies requires the formulation of a set of concepts and distinctions in order to adequately understand the thesis that is presented in this work. The definition of "peripheral" thinking, "Centralitarism" (as distinct from "centralism"), "Identitarism" (as distinct from "traditionalism" and particularly from "nationalism," especially when a concept as key as this, and that will appear many times throughout these pages, has been inflated in recent decades and confused with multiple expressions with which it is related, but not a synonym) are crucial issues. Nevertheless, it is not only that. Issues such as mutations in eidetic systems, their crosses and their relationships with intellectual and social environments with which they enter in symbiosis; issues such as the distinction between "eidetic systems" and "sensibilities" -those "broths" where the life of the peripheral thinking emerged- take on great importance, even more when we add the circulation of ideas within the intellectual networks of the periphery. In summary, they are all topics of discussion, needing clarification.

Eidetics Studies. Studies on ideas have grown significantly in recent decades, and the schools that attempt to address them are diversifying. It is called "eidology" or "eidetic studies" the discipline that studies ideas, understanding many paradigms: sociology of knowledge, conceptual studies, history of ideas, history of philosophy, visions of the world, studies of thought, history of science, among other options.

Eidetic studies have been linked in order to interpret or explain their objects to sociology, economics, political science, historiography, and even ecology. In their quest to find a language and appropriate formulations, in addition to the aforementioned disciplines, eidetic studies have been inspired by linguistics, literary, philosophical, and cultural studies; they have also been inspired by geography and biology, without prejudice to adjustments and adaptations. One of the main potentialities of the discipline is its ability to hybridize languages with the purpose of using and hybridizing paradigms from quite distant origins.

Eidetic studies have always worked with various disciplines, although for some reason they have tended to be called "History of…," despite the fact that they haven't performed true historiography on numerous occasions. The diachronic or progressive dimension has not always been present. In many occasions, there have been synchronous studies. However, in a

broader sense, this endeavor has delved into various disciplines in order to understand its purpose. For example, the Marxist school, in particular, has had discussions with the Economy in order to explain the emergence of ideas. As the "sociology of knowledge," it has wanted to understand eidetic facts in relation to the context and infrastructure. In truth, it has typically been called "history," for referring more to the past than taking a truly historical perspective or specific historiographical methods. Moreover, even when, from time to time, it has intended to refer to the present, it has been called "History of the present."

In this regard, we are attempting to overcome these low-rise eidetic studies that, protected behind the narrow limits of the Nation-State, provide just a few elements of the European influences to the "buyers" intellectuals of such elements. *Eidetic studies as part of the sciences of knowledge*.

In regions where "little has been thought," where too many "already made ideas" have been received, where production is relatively poor according to global indicators and where the objectives desired by the intelligentsia have not been achieved, the study of ideas obtains particular relevance with the purpose of improving-increasing their production. Due to this fact, eidetic studies are created which concern themselves with increasing the production of ideas. Their *leitmotif* would be to understand and improve the production of knowledge-ideas. Now, what seems to be urgent for regions with little or poor eidetic production is valid for all humanity, because it is always possible to produce more and better ideas.

The aspiration to transform eidetic studies into an endeavor that contributes to a better way of thinking has somehow always been present. Those who study ideas more or less hazily aspire to be able to think better in the future by relying on their contributions. However, they don't usually dare to thematize this aspiration, maybe in order not to be held accountable for what they write, or maybe it is possible that they do not know how to connect their studies about the past with the possibility of thinking in a better way in the future.

In this sense, the challenge of some eidetic studies, whose goal is not only to study what has happened in eidetic territories but also to improve the production of ideas and knowledge, emerges in a similar way to that of development economics, which not only looks at how the economy works, but tries to epistemically contribute to the generation of development or, more broadly, the generation of wealth. The relationship between the history of ideas and eidetic studies is similar to the relationship between economic history and

Economy. This is how the proposal for a sub-discipline such as "Eidology development" should be understood; it should be understood as an equivalent to " Development Studies" in Economy. Therefore, eidetic studies are conceived as a science of knowledge and a discipline to enhance the production of knowledge: the study of ideas as a condition for the production of ideas; it is the work for the production of more and better ideas.

In the belief that human beings cannot be communities without ideas, or better, that we live with and through ideas and our coexistence with better ideas makes us live better (good ideas make us better human beings), we will conclude that the only possible life without ideas is in a vegetative state, although there is no certainty about this matter.

The "peripheralization" of ideas. It has often been said that various regions of the world "imported" ideas from Europe and then "adapted" them. This "adaptation" is understood as the selection of some aspects, the trimming of others, as well as their accentuation or decrease. This perception is correct. However, it passes by the side of a more meaningful matter. These ideas were not just "adapted" to a society in which they were originally "out of place." In fact, when changing ecosystems, these ideas acquired new meanings. When expressing this change, the concept of "adaptation" in various occasions falls short, and sometimes it's way too big.

Ideas, brought and carried out in that manner, end up expressing things that were not contained in their initial formulations; they're not necessarily opposite from that formulation, just different. When we locate those ideas in the dilemma to *be like the center versus being ourselves,* they achieve a different meaning. Inserted into another totality, the context of the relationships changes their meaning. For example, Gandhi did something similar with the ideas of H. D. Thoreau. Passive resistance, assumed as *satyagraha*, became the expression of the Indian identity. It ceases to be one of the several "methods" of battle and becomes the ideal method as it expresses the identity of a people. Then, there's an "indianization" of the thoreauvian notion. Nevertheless, it's not only that—there is also a "peripheralization−" a location of that notion in the peripheral dilemma, which, in this case, aims to be-ourselves. Something similar happened with Aurobindo Ghosh, who performed a reinterpretation of the ancestral spiritualism of the Hindu culture, associating it with the Indian identity in opposition to the west and a supposed mission stating that India would have to spiritualize the world by recreating,

for the second time (so to say) a message that Vivekananda had already reworked years before in the same manner (Mukhopadhyay 1979, 201 et seqs).

One of the ways in which ideas coming from the outside are incorporated into the peripheral dilemma is through the hybridization with ancestral ideas of the region; this was the case with Gandhi, but this is not always indispensable. This can happen without ideas coming from the outside; it can also occur with those ideas present in the region itself since ancestral times—ideas which re-emerged through "peripheral sensitivity." This is the case with Salafism or Wahhabism, which having existed for centuries, reworked themselves to be part of the peripheral dilemma. It is a mutation, a recovery or a capitalization. In the peripheral quandary, people with previous training rework and rethink their own ideas and transform them thereby leading them to be part of the quandary. That partially takes place with Salafism of Al-Afghani or Rodó's spiritualism. Such elaborations often occur with the incorporation of some eidetic components from the center, drawing upon them in order to mix them with the ideas present in the local tradition.

Cartography and other graphic and mnemonic procedures to locate and apprehend great processes: The intention to provide broad visions both geographically and temporally has led us to rely on a system of graphic and mnemonic resources that allow us to apprehend a great amount of societies, countries, cities, names, institutions, schools of thought and key dates, among other data. Articulating this in a synthetic way has led us to the idea of drawing up an **Atlas of thought** that would become a compendium of all of that data and, simultaneously, could capitalize on the contributions of computer technology to add value to the information.

The intentionality behind encompassing processes gives all the more importance to the elaboration of cartographies, comparisons, or parallels that show the existence of an intelligentsia and a production of peripheral thought that, in some way, is related to the various peripheral societies and their various times.

Intellectual networks. Method and project: Within eidetic issues, topics such as the circulation of ideas and intellectual networks should also be considered. The work on intellectual networks is part of eidetic studies; however, networks are not limited to them, nor are they in their borders—they are both a method and a project. To what extent are they "method and project?"

The study on intellectual networks is a method to detect long-term contacts among people dedicated to the intellectual endeavor

(although not necessarily to just that endeavor). The method entails detecting the existence of channels of circulation and more and less dense nodes in which ideas are worked and various initiatives are generated. Studying the historical experiences of some of the great intellectual networks means providing inputs on how to create conditions of possibilities to work more productively with eidetic systems.

On the other hand, in some way, from the study itself the capitalization project of existing networks is released: their experience, their trajectory, their density and their production, in order to advance the work with and for ideas.

The study of the networks of the peripheral intelligentsia, likewise, aims toward the constitution of a global civil society. The dilemma is prepared within the operating networks in an intellectual field, and the positions (and oppositions) in which the various sectors are placed is also prepared there. In the upcoming six chapters we address the subject of networks, in some cases with sufficient depth and detail—provided that we have found sufficient information—and in others with just a brief description. Needless to say, there are a large amount of areas in which the relationship among the main figures of the intelligentsia, as well as the constitution of scenarios with and by the networks that unfolded there and their relation to other regions of the world has not been studied.

Because of its means, its vision of the world and because of the institutionality it possesses, the intelligentsia of the central regions has had the greatest impact on the constitution of supra-national intellectual networks, even transcending the regions covered by the Center itself. On the other hand, the peripheral intelligentsia have been relatively lagging behind in this plane, although in geography and population it comprises the largest part of the world.

To move forward, the study on how these networks have been created and maintained seems to be a matter of utmost concern to the study of the intelligentsia in general, particularly for the study of the constitution of a "civil society" of a global nature and learning about how ideas have circulated in modern times. The most developed cases are: the network of Ibero-American enlightenment, toward the 1800; the network of the Slavic Intelligentsia, in particular the exiled one, and their connections far beyond the domains of their languages, toward 1850; the intellectual network of Islamic revivalism, toward the 1900; the Pan-Asianism network, and even the relationships between this and some manifestations of Pan-Islamism, also toward 1900; the networks that articulate the

independence movement and the Indian nationalism with theosophy, between 1900 and 1920; the indigenous-Aprista-mestizophilian networks in Latin America toward 1920-1940; Pan-Africanist networks with connections that link the Caribbean and USA to Africa and Europe by the 1950; and, finally, the networks of social-economic sciences linked by the topic of development, between 1950-1975.

Conceptual definitions: "peripheral" thinking is defined as thought that emerged within communities impacted by the presence of the new center while witnessing the traditional understanding of the world that they possessed become unhinged. To understand this process, a set of concepts must be taken into account, as well as delving into new ways of understanding the eidetic phenomena.

Concepts: The matter of appropriate concepts is very important for several reasons, because in order to understand reality, it is key to use concepts that account for it; this is due to the fact that the constitution of a discipline involves, to a great extent, the creation of a specific conceptualization.

In order to adequately understand the two poles of the dilemma, they must be distinguished from similar positions and related concepts, which are often mistaken. They also must be particularly distinguished from common uses by people who mix concepts simply due to the lack of professional skills.

"Identitarism" is not traditionalism. The claim for identity has to do with the cultural trajectory, but it should not be understood as a return to the past nor as the continued presence in it. Identitarism is the tendency to deepen one's own culture and history by establishing the difference in regard to other cultures, particularly those of the center. There are Identitarisms that are not nationalists but continentalists (as Gabriela Mistral's); there are also Identitarisms that are not independentist, such as the current Bolivian Indigenism (because it comes about in already independent states). Some Identitarisms are not traditionalists (because they don't intend to revive a golden past) but aim toward the construction of progressives projects for greater freedom and social justice with the abolition of castes and other inequalities.

"Nationalism" is the affirmation of the nation and the search for its independence toward the constitution of a Nation State. There are nationalisms that are not identitarian because they aim to move through the imitation of the center, for example Sutan Sjahrir in Indonesia, or James Africanus Horton in Sierra Leone. On the other hand, not all independentism is nationalist.

"Independentism" is the search for independence in regard to a metropolis, an empire or any given power. There are independentisms that are neither identitarian nor nationalists or traditionalist, but only by convenience or pragmatism. The most significant case is that of Gonzalo Pizarro in Peru in the middle of the 16th century; something similar can be said of the independence movements of slave traders in Mozambique and Angola toward 1820, who sought independence from the metropolis in order to continue their trade, without leading a project of nation-State.

"Traditionalism," as a synonym for conservative, is the defense of archaic customs, the search for the return to a golden age and the affirmation of values, which supposedly ruled at that time. There are traditionalisms that are not nationalist nor independentist; they only exist for the conservative search from a golden age, such as the Opus Dei, until 1970, and Fiducia.

It should be noted that there are schools of thought that, at the same time, can be identitarian, nationalist, pro-independence supporters, as well as traditionalists. An example of this is the Kuomingtang, in the 1940s, Taiwan.

"Centralitarism" is the idea of building a better society in the periphery inspired by the model of the center. Centralitarism is not "centralism" as a fight against the provinces or regions nor against federalism; it is also not synonymous of traitor and homeland betrayer, as a populist identitarism has considered it. It may be objected that Centralitarism, due to its imitation of the center, ends up accepting its modes of being because it relates to it and because it paves its way. It can also be argued, on the other hand that, on numerous occasions, the centralitarian supporters have overtaken those models and jeopardized the powers that once dominated their regions: Japan and South Korea are some of the most rampant examples.

4.   The proposals of some scholars to understand the dynamics of ideas in peripheral regions.

Several authors who have studied Latin American thought, as well as Asian, African, Slavic, Arabic, Iberian, and Islamic thought have approached the notion of a "peripheral" thinking, without fully achieving it.

Arjun Appadurai argues that the central problem of current global interactions is the tension between homogenization versus heterogeneity (2003, 1).

Nicholas Berdiaev, referring to Russia, has pointed out that the Russian people responded to the reforms of Peter the Great by giving rise to two movements: the Slavophile movement and the westernized movement. They gave rise to these movements in such a way that "all of Russian thought magnetized by general Russian ideas has incarnated into one or another of these trends and has wanted to settle the always open question in any form that it was raised: Should Russia continue along the path opened by Peter the Great or, on the contrary, should it return to the old Muscovite state?" (1940, 31-32).

Referring to Poland, Jerzy Jedlicki stresses that "Polish thinking, which was permanently engaged in a ceaseless struggle with the dilemma of 'civilization and nationality,' looks for either the border that would separate both kingdoms, or a magic formula that would unify them. It is not important where the line goes—who is in favor of civilization, the imitation of the West or the landscape of the future, and who opts for nationality, self-sustaining culture and a landscape of the past. The conflict was experienced by each individual mind which was able to share an order in the elusive course of events and dreams of the era" (1999, 26). The idea of defending the national essence against the invasion of foreign concepts provoked a strong emotional response. The general thesis was quickly applied to legislation, industry, philosophy and art (1999, 22).

Regarding the Balkans, Roumen Daskalov has argued that the educated strata of the so-called "intelligentsia" was divided between "Westernizers" and "autochthonists." He also argued that the literary-artistic intelligentsia was specifically divided between the "modernists (Europeanists, cosmopolitan movements), who professed faith in "modernity" (meaning in this case urban and European standards) and aspired to "universal values." On the other hand, there were those who supported the "native" (idealizing the past and the culture of the people). The first approach was more "individualist," while the latter tried to express the feelings and worries of the "people" (1997, n/p).

Referring to populism between Slavs and the Balkan states, Angus Stewart says that "the two facets of the 'populist situation' are reflected in the ideological synthesis of traditionalism and modernism. The varieties of populist ideology that are found in many of the new African and Asian States emphasize modernization, but in modernization that takes place on the basis of native forms, which would avoid the disruptive consequences of modernization in the West" (1970, 236).

Regarding the Spain of the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, Ignacio Fernández Sarasola highlighted the fact that "the penetration of enlightenment, especially from France, brought a doctrinal excision into Spain that would extend its footprints throughout the 19th century." On the one hand, a movement of determined opponents of everything that meant a loss of values and the national spirit arose: the 'apologists,' whose most relevant visible head was John Paul Forner, highlighted the history of Spain as a reaction against the cultural invasion of France. A second group—which could be defined as 'reformist'—followed the ensigns of the Illustration in a more moderate way. Its most notable influences were the French Physiocracy and the German Cameralism, which led them to seek administrative reforms organized from power, thus forming a true "enlightened despotism" that was only partially achieved with Carlos III. Among the representatives of this position we could mention Francisco Cabarrús. Finally, a third group, which we could call 'Groundbreaking,' took the most revolutionary ideology from France. Far from taking faint reforms into account, this group sought to alter the foundation of the State from a recognition of the natural rights of individuals and the establishment of a division of powers in which the legislative parliament—an expression of the national will—was the political center. This position was already anticipated with León de Arroyal. In this regard, it can be said that Arroyal was the opposite face of Forner" (Fernández n/d).

Jacques Berque, referring to Muslim societies, argues that "they are in a permanent crisis in which an impulse toward modernism and a nostalgia toward authenticity are opposed as the two poles of their lives" (1981, 87). For his part, Mohamed Arkoun working with "the political views that begin to stand tall in the face of the situations created by colonization, strive to take into account the topics of backwardness, decadence, weakness, and the underdevelopment that progress, and the strength of the West, has revealed. From the beginning, the challenge response has taken on two forms: the tendency of liberal intellectuals trained in Europe and open to a gradual acculturation and the Islamic tendency which proposed a return to the teachings of Islam under the authority of pious elderly" (1986, 155). Nazih Ayubi said that Muslim thinkers (in the second half of the 20th century) continue their search for a new formula that can combine "modernity" with "authenticity" (Ayubi 2000, 94). Burhan Ghalioun underlines that, according to Olivier Carré in his books from the years 1985 and 1986, there are two antagonistic intellectual elites in the Arab world. One wants to

be modernized in the westernized sense and they even desire to be voluntarily uprooted. The other elite, the traditional one, is quite anchored in the religious heritage; it is in symbiosis with what Ghalioun called 'popular culture' or 'cultural consensus' (Carre 2004, 195-196).

With regard to Egypt, Anouar Abdel-Malek notes that a part of the intellectual elite turns toward the great European revolutions to find there the intelligibility of decadence, sources of reflection and the key of the models for the future, that is to say, of renaissance. These elites are mainly those formed in modern schools in Egypt, and in the school missions in Europe; Tahtawi is the unanswerable teacher here. A second part of these elites is formed in the traditional world of Islamic teaching dominated by Al-Azhar. These intellectuals will turn quite naturally toward the endogenous search; and this, with Abduh, will lead to the need to make a return to the sources originating in religion, where the indispensable elements for the Renaissance will be found (1969, 507). Attempting a synthesis, Claude Liauzu argues that, since the arrival of Bonaparte to Egypt, one and the same question haunts the societies of the South: How to stay themselves while changing, since change is the condition of existence? What is the secret of the superiority of the West? What can they borrow from there? To what extent do these borrowings question the future of the Arab and Muslim identity? Is it possible to dissociate the technique, the domain of material power, values, and anthropology? (1994, 123). Hassan al-Banna and Taha Hussein propose two Egypts, where part of the West and the reference to Islam are opposed to each other (1994, 138). Along the same lines of attempting a synthesis, Gerard Chaliand states that, before the colonial shock, the influence of traditional and literate societies of clerics has been common to all societies of state tradition. They have represented religious values (categories often confused in a single one) by taking refuge in tradition as an ideology of resistance, all for the purpose of exalting the past and preaching patience in waiting for other times. In Vietnam, (as in China) intellectuals, when criticizing the national sovereign states that have subjected themselves to the outside, do so in the name of "virtue," and dream of restoring a sovereignty worthy of the "Mandate from Heaven." In Muslim countries, the men of religion, representing the Ummah (Islamic community), preach fidelity to the faith and the traditional ways of life. After defeat or occupation, the tense maintenance of traditional values will be the foundation of this resistance ideology. Another current soon appears, by the hand of a westernized bourgeoisie that pushes to

modernize the country through the adoption, similar to Europe, of parliamentary or republican ways and equip themselves with modern political parties (1979, 29).

Regarding *sud*-Saharan thinkers, Margareth Read has explained the tendency of Africans which have been exposed to European impact to move from a phase of imitation of the European culture to one of rediscovery, as well as pre-affirmation of traditional values and the search for some form of synthesis. This effort of synthesis was at times previous to nationalism, according to what was quoted by Thomas Hodgkin (1958, 171). Pathe Diagne, for his part, thinks that already in 1850, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone—places where centers of higher education had been founded—a conflict emerged between advocates of cultural nationalism that urged for the recognition of native traditions (such as E. W. Blyden), and the supporters of the unconditional integration in the European linguistic and cultural tradition (such as J. Africanus Horton, in Sierra Leone). In addition, there was conflict with the supporters of the "acculturation," who intended to adapt the African difference—personality, Negritude and Africanness—with the English, French, German or Portuguese identities. This debate continues to be a central theme in the contemporary development of Africa (1982, 132). Pieter Boele van Hensbroek, following a similar line, maintains that "one can identify in the African Intellectual history a family of authors who share the idea that there is an African culture and a distinctive life experience or a way of being in the world" (2001,129). E. A. Ayendele, referring to the elite who lived in the West African ports, writes that these ports were "incubators of a new species of Africans hybrids, transformed by enchantment and passionate followers of the values, ideas, norms, customs, ways of thinking, religion and cosmography of the west; deserters from their homeland cultural heritage; a parade in the mental universe of the white man; apostles of political, economic, social and cultural aspirations completely different from the rest of the continent. These educated Africans dreamed of a continent which would emerge long after their deaths, a continent that would be moving toward modernization using the best advances in science and technology, which have begun to transform Europe and other parts of the white world in places of wonder" (1971, 691). Toyin Falola, for his part, when presenting the varieties of nationalism, distinguishes between "those who can be defined as 'traditionalists' for insisting that the old ways are better than western civilization and (…) at the other end there are the 'Assimilationists,' who state that change may come if Africans accept western

civilization (…) and are also the 'halfway' who advocate the assumption of certain aspects of western civilization while keeping other aspects of Tradition" (2001, 30).

With regard to China, India and Japan, Jean Chesneaux notes that westernizers, because of their adherence to the West, forgot that the West was the owner of their countries. They left the struggle for National liberation at the end of their agendas. They were in a weak situation facing the patriots who defended the integrity of national traditions. The duel between Tilak and Gokhale was the most illustrious episode of a fundamental debate on the conditions of progress in modern Asia; we can also find it in China and Southeast Asia, as well as in Russia between Slavophiles and westernizers (Chesneaux 1969 a, 169-170). With respect to Singapore, David Kenley described the movement for the New Culture at the beginning of the twentieth century as an attempt to position themselves between nationalism and Illustration (2003). Regarding the Chinese case at the beginning of the twentieth century, Lucien Bianco has written that "born from the same need, hostile nationalism to the west and the cultural westernization are two offspring twins" (1999, 63). With respect to the discussion in China, Zhang Lun (2003, 146-149) highlights the opposition between liberal-westernizers and neo-Confucian-neo-traditionalists scholars, noting the existence of a conciliatory position which maintains that every culture has its benefits or contributions, and that the Chinese modernization must exploit the positive sides of tradition.

Leopoldo Zea, attending to Latin American thinking, uses similar notions. With regard to positivists, he wrote that they were "the builders of the new order, seeking to transform their peoples into copies, unfortunately only copies, or forms of an order foreign to our reality" (1976,9). Taking the work of Edmundo O'Gorman, he developed this idea and pointed out that the history of the Latin American people would be that of "those who have endeavored to become something else than what they are. Yesterday, they were similar to the Iberian metropolis, after that, similar to the great modern models, to the great modern nations of England, France, and the United States. This is similar to the western world. It's the man that hurts himself and has been hurt by being out of history" (1976, 28). This contrasts with the Latin American thought of the 20th century that is characterized as "the search for identity of the man in this America (identity) from which he will be able to demand the recognition of his humanity (1976, 9). This awareness creates "a sort of cultural and philosophical nationalism that gives meaning to

one of the greatest expressions of contemporary Latin American thinking" (1976,13). In a way, summarizing his interpretation, he argued that "the dilemma seems to be between imitation or assimilation; this is because "in our America Westernization, or plain Europeanization, it never really worked. That is why a second way has been chosen nowadays, which is the Americanization of the inherited culture" (1976, 47).

Referring to "Modern Indian thinking," V. S. Naravane states that thinkers manifest in different ways a "desire to preserve the Indian heritage as much as possible and as well as being on good terms with the challenges of our era" (1964, 270). Specifically, regarding Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay (or Chatterji), Partha Chatterjee has tried to point out the dilemma of his thought, arguing that "the divergence between *modern* and *traditional* was not really solved in Bankim in a somehow historically specific way, because the specificity of the modern and the specificity of the national remained different and opposing." This was not given in a homogeneous way. Chatterjee also highlights that in recent work there are clear signs of how deeply he was immersed in the difficult problem of "reconciling the post-illustrated European nationality with the patriotic urgency to establish a cultural and intellectual identity of a colonized people" (1986, 67).

In short, we have:

Appadurai : Heterogenization/Homogenization (the world in general)
Arkoun : Return to Islam and the ancient ones/Progressive acculturation (Islamic World)
Ayendele : Most of the Africans/ imitators, importers, modernization (Sud-S Africa)
Ayubi : Authenticity/Modernity (Muslim world)
Berdiaev : Slavophiles / Westernizers (Russia)
Berque : Authenticity / Modernism (Arabs)
Bianco : Hostile to nationalism towards the West/cultural westernization (China)
Boele van H. : African way of being in the world/ (no definition) (Sud-S Africa)
Chaliand : Take refuge in tradition /Westernizing (China, Vietnam, Arab States)
Chatterjee : Traditional, national identity/Modern, European rationality (India)
Chesneaux : Patriots/Westernizers (China, India, Japan)

Daskalov   : Nativist autochthonist/Westernizers
                   "Universal Values" (Balkans)

Diagne   : Unconditional traditionalism/ Adaptation/
                   Integration (Sud-S Africa)

Falola: Traditionalists/Midway/assimilationist
                   (Sud-S Africa)

Fenandez-S.   : Reaction against French cultural invasion/
                   assumption of European illustrated ideas (Spain)

Hunter   : Fundamentalists/Westernizers (Islamic world)

Jedlicki   : Slavophiles/Westernizers or Nationality;
                   /Civilization (Poland)

Kenley   : Nationalism / Illustration (Singapore)

Liauzu   : Keeping their identity/Westernizing (Arabs)

Naravane   : To preserve the heritage/take on challenges of
                   our era (India)

M. Read   : Affirmation of one's own culture/ imitation of
                   the European culture (Sud-S Africa)

Stewart   : Traditionalism / Modernism (Russia)
                   Modernism with native forms/Westernized
                   Modernism (Africa, Asia)

Zea   : Identity, cultural nationalism, assimilation/
                   Copy, be in a different way, westernization (Latin
                   America)

Zhang Lun : Neo-Traditionalism-neo -
                   Confucianism/Westernizing Liberalism (Post
                   Mao China)[2]

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[2] **Various quandaries to the peripheral.** It should be noticed that there have also been dilemmas or polarities which cannot be assimilated to what we are trying to develop this time. It is the case of the opposition between "appropriation" and "redemption" spoken by Grant Goodman, referring to the Philippines and Japan, and particularly to their mutual relations. Although there are some elements that bring "appropriationist" and identitarian thinkers "redemptionists" and centralitarian thinkers closer together, there are elements that clearly don't do that in other respects and, in any case, there is no necessity in that proximity, but perhaps only coincidence. Goodman said: "In both Japan and the Philippines, there has emerged what might be called "schools of thought" about the nature of these (their respective) interactions. I will call these schools one of "appropriation" and one of "redemption". The appropriation Filipinos were those who, mainly under the influence of Spanish colonialism and later of the American colonialism, interpreted each Japanese contact with the Philippines (such as economic, political, and immigration contact) as part of a great conspiracy, hidden in order to colonize the islands and extend the Japanese hegemony over them. The Japanese counterpart of the appropriationist Filipinos were left-wing Japanese intellectuals who, especially during the 1920 and 1930, judged the entire Japanese foreign policy in classic Marxist terms. That is why they perceived that the Japanese interests in regions such as the Philippines were motivated only by the 'bourgeois capitalist 'imperialist expansionism', or what I called appropriation. The school of redemption in the Philippines was composed by the Filipinos who throughout the colonial period perceived the Japanese as possible saviors. They saw the Japanese as Asian fellows whose territorial proximity, ethnic backgrounds, and finally the industrial and military achievements transformed them into the natural helpers for the achievement of the Filipino nation. The core of this school of redemption was

It should be noted that there are those who deny this (or these) dilemma(s) on the grounds that they are simplifications or wrong ways to raise the problem. Yves Benot, inspired by Kwame Nkrumah, wondered whether "from a cultural point of view, Africa should be divided between westernizers and traditionalists, or even between rationalists and supporters of the negritude. This classification, often carried out by many (non-Africans) supporters of the negritude and African traditionalism, is outside the African reality defined by Nkrumah. Nkrumah define this reality as a continent that is different from the traditional Africa, before the slave trade and colonization since it can be currently considered as a continent where pre-colonial traditions, Islamic influences and and Euro-Christian influences are mixed" (Benot 1973).

Also, J. Mutel, referring to Japan between 1853 and 1912, denies this dilemma. He points out that "the movement of ideas, translated into literary works or into organizations, is testimony to the same moral crisis of society. The import of foreign doctrines and the spectacle of political and social changes cause two trends to arise: one insists on the emancipation of the individual and the other believes in the value and need for Authority. The debate is not between supporters of an imitation of the West and supporters of a frozen tradition, nor between imitators and reactionary" (Mutel 1970, 178).

On the other hand, there were some authors who tended to universalize what they had studied for particular cases by establishing connections with other regions in their own time or in others, although always referring to the latest centuries[3].

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represented by the branch of the Philippine radicalism originated in the period of the Philippine revolution at the end of the 19th century, which had engendered the dream that they only could be free with external assistance and that Japan was the only logical source of such support. In Japan, the theory of redemption kept a handful of shishi (men of high purposes or, more specifically, super patriotic and ultra-nationalist, as they define themselves) whose activist energies and mysterious romantic cabala wrongly represented their political insignificance. However, their Pan-Asianism was directly related to the romantic realism of the Filipinos group who were still considering the Japanese as their liberators of their western colonialism" (Goodman 1995, 137-8).

[3] **What people think in the periphery has been developed in the center.** All approaches that are presented assume, although they don't necessarily agree among themselves, that somehow the peripheries have some specific ways of thinking. There is, however, another interpretation of things that claims that everything that has been thought in the periphery lacks originality and/or specificity. This interpretation states that, in fact, all of the ideas of the periphery have been created in the West. This is the case of Baogang He (2004, 107) who, echoing Stephen Hay (1970, 314), claims that "The original idea of Pan-Asianism came from the West. When Western intellectuals became disillusioned with their own Judeo-Christian or Greco-Roman heritages". This idea was then adopted by Rabindranath Tagore. Something similar is stated by H.B. Paksoy (1991) when highlighting that "the Pan-Turanianism or Pan-Turkism, were formulated and initiated in Europe - but not in Central Asia- during the occupation of Tashkent by Russia. These formulations, he states, were daughters of the brain of the Orientalist Hungarian Arminius Vambery.

For her part, Shireen T. Hunter tries to establish a sort of typology of responses to modernity. Referring more specifically to the Islamic world and while trying to universalize its response to all "western" societies, she argues that the answers to modernity (or to the West) have been: revolutionary innovation, especially expressed in communism and anarchism; fundamentalism, whose expressions would be the Slavophilia, the Meiji Shinto, a variety of Islamic ideologies and the movement of Hinduism within the nationalist movement of India; also, westernization, based on the belief in the superiority of the western modernity; and finally synthesis, based on the idea of combining the best of the traditional society and the most positive features of modernity. Examples of this are visible in the pre-socialist China, Japan and the Islamic world (Hunter n/d 25-26)

Regarding Japan and the Islamic world, Selçuk Esenbel postulates that both the Japanese Pan-Asians and Muslim intellectuals were concerned with the problem of how to be part of the modern world and benefit from their achievements while preserving their native cultures. Just as the Japanese Pan-Asians, who were deeply critical of the imitation of the European culture, some Muslim intellectuals of the 19th century, especially Pan-Islamists, were critics of the extreme Europeanization of Muslim societies. They looked to Japanese reform as a desirable model of modernity for the Islamic world, to the extent that the Japanese seemed to be able to handle westernization without throwing away their traditions. Pan-Islamic arguments of the Ottoman intellectual Mehmet Akif and of the young Turk Abdullah Cevdet, highlighted the preservation in Japan of a spiritual culture in harmony with modern reforms. The Tatar *intelligentsia*, as well as the Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkism of the Russia of the Romanov, shared these ideas. The devotees of these ideas even pretended to convert Japan in order to strengthen the Islamic world. The Arab world shared this sympathy toward Japan. Mustafa Kamil, Ahmad Fadzli and other Pan-Islamic intellectuals in Egypt published popular books about Japan as the star that should guide the East (Esenbel 2004, n/p).

Mahjoubi brilliantly sums up what the position of centralitarian (supporters of "modernism") was, not only in the Middle East, which are the ones that he refers to. However, there obviously was multiple emphasis on the Middle East position, although not all of them took the elements of the paradigm that

Mahjoubi designed: "Modernism comes from fascination, since the 19th century, of a fraction of the eastern elite for the progress made by the West in modern times. It's about taking its guide in order to acquire the means of its renaissance and its development and reduce the decline of their own countries. And western methods which may need to be adapted to eastern countries, are not only at the economic and social level, but also at the level of armies, institutions and education. More precisely, it is about giving those countries political regimes founded on constitutions that guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens. It is also about providing a modern education based on sciences, critical thinking and reason. The objective was to break away from the archaic methods governing eastern countries and pull them out of obscurantism and project them into the light of 'civilization.' The adoption of the western model is all the more imperative, to the extent that it allows people to acquire the means of power of the capitalist countries, a condition *sine qua non* to resist their hegemony and to safeguard independence and sovereignty (Mahjoubi 1999, 81).

Zhang Yongle (2010, 48) defines what he calls the search for an "alternative modernity," which is distinct from the West and able to give an account of the Chinese intellectual legacy. This corresponds to a well-established pattern among the thinkers of the colonial world, the semi colonial world, and the ex-colonial one, or, in any event, a world which was not western. The purpose of this was to achieve the political momentum to recover the cultural resources to resist the pretensions of a supposed modernization of universal character, modernization inspired in the West. Examples of this pattern can be detected from Ireland to Turkey, from Peru to Iran, and from India to Japan. In different ways, everyone shared this momentum, from Yeats and Gaelic revivalism, Ziya Gokalp and José Carlos Mariátegui, Jamal Al-Afgani and Vinayak Savarkar, to M. Gandhi and Kita Ikki.

David Curtin (1972) refers to the very conventional tension between modernizers and traditionalists, although he establishes interesting subdivisions. Among the first (westernizers), he places utopian modernizers and the neo-traditionalists; among the second, he includes ordinary or common conservatives, utopian reactionaries and defensive modernizers. What is most interesting, however, and something that makes him very exceptional, is the fact that he is able to refer to very diverse regions of the world by classifying authors with these items. He includes among westernizers Mustafa Kemal and his followers, Hu Shi, in China, D. F. Sarmiento, and Mexican scientists. Among utopian modernizers,

he includes the communists in the USSR, and the Chinese communists; among the neo-traditionalists, the Turkish young people before the First World War, also those who formulated African socialism, the intellectuals of the Meiji Restoration, Arielism and Afro-Cubanism. Among the common conservatives, he places those who sought to preserve their culture or return to a longed-for past prior to western impact. Among utopian reactionaries, Curtin highlights those who were trying to seek refuge, starting from the current way of life and the recent past, in an idealized image of the distant past. He refers to cases of popular revolts such as the Indian rebellion of 1857, as well as the Saya San Rebellion in Myanmar in the 1930s and the Wahhabi movement in Arabia in the 18th century. Finally, among the defensive modernizers, he includes those who sought to preserve, as much as possible, the traditional way of life, for which they assumed certain forms of modernization in military aspects.

Eugeniusz Górski (1994, 75) has pointed out that "East-European and Latin American intellectuals have paid much attention to the various relationships that bind their countries with the West. The tendency to identify themselves with the western culture and tradition has been particularly strong in Central and Eastern Europe and in the southern areas of Latin America. But the western values also found numerous devotees and supporters in Russia, in the Balkan countries and in the American republics where the Indian population or mestizo predominate. On the other hand, he faces this position with the search for historical roots and national identity, where the thinkers of those East-European regions have often resorted to the Slavic spiritual tradition. A very similar situation occurred in Latin America where, at the beginning of the 20th century, "the indigenous tradition was called back" (1994, 109). He draws a parallel between the two movements, noting that "it is a well-known fact that both Slavophiles as the Latin American indigenous tended to exaggerate the native character of their perspectives and specific traits of their backward countries (1994, 99).

Jerzy jedlicki (1999, 23) universalizes the conclusions he obtained for Poland: "This is the drama that dominates the era. It is indeed the same drama that is experienced even today and without exception by all countries, nations and tribes when they are confronted with the expansion of the western type of civilization, with its ideological and political models, science, technology, capitalist production and middle-class style. Everywhere, this expansion divides the national intelligence into 'slavophiles' and

'westernizers,' meaning there is division between defenders of the native traditions and enthusiastic supporters of imported modernity. The task of both factions is to sharpen the opposition of principles until—in the exalted world of feelings and ideas—national culture and supranational civilization seem to be incompatible."

Leopoldo Zea (1990, 241-242), for his part, raises the matter in the following terms: "Identity as a way to identify ourselves in a context we would like to seize." This has been the central problem in Ibero-America, as it has been the problem of peoples who know they are marginalized by Europe itself. This is the problem of the Spanish, who dream of being accepted by Europe as a European, as well as a Russian, which insistently seeks windows to Europe (yesterday), and to the West (today); they seek windows to a world that denies them the right to participate by considering them foreign. The problem of identity is stated in Latin America, Spain and Russia: "Latin Americans who dream of being the 'Yankees of the south,' or the French or English people of this America. Russia poses the dilemma between Occidentalism and Slavism. The Spanish seek in France or Germany what they would like to be." "The awareness of dependence and, from there, their own viewpoint on that situation. The peripheral approach, that is, of the peoples who until yesterday revolved as satellites around a group of men, a philosophy, a history that, though it was their own, due to the relationship they had with it, didn't express their own point of view. The point of view that arises from the awareness of dependence, marginalization, awareness of the periphery in respect to a center that is not theirs." Inspired in a sentence of Sartre, who said "It would have been necessary to create the socialist man on the basis of his land, his language and even his renovated customs. Based on only from this, man will little by little cease to be the product of his product to become the son of man," Zea states that "we find the same concern in our America in Bolívar, Bilbao, Martí; the same in Ganivet, Costa, Menéndez Pelayo, Unamuno and Ortega in Spain, as well as in Herzen, Belinsky, Dostoyevsky and Turgenief in Russia, and in the many" in Asia and Africa (1990, 243-244).

The author with the greatest projections and, to some extent, inspiring others, was Arnold J. Toynbee (1948), who developed the tension between Herodians and Zealots. He argues that, since ancient times, a Herodian or Zealot behavior can be observed when a civilized society is in a dangerous situation faced with another. These ideal types produced by Toynbee are not related to thought, but to life attitudes and politics, although, without a doubt, they

offer interesting projections toward the characterization of thinking ways. The Zealot is the person who seeks refuge from the unknown in the familiar and when in war, responds by using the traditional art. He can be described as an archaism evoked by the foreign presence. In modern Islam this position is represented by Sanusism and Wahhabism. Herodianism, in contrast, is represented by Mehmed Ali. The Herodian is the man who acts according to the principle that the most effective way to guard against the danger of the unknown is to manage its secrets, and when it comes to war, he discards his tradition and learns to fight with the tactics and weapons of the enemy. Zealotism is a form of archaism, evoked by the impact of the outsider. Herodianism is clearly the most effective of the alternatives—the Zealot acts by instinct, hiding his head in the sand like an orchid—while the Herodian acts according to his reason.

In this way, by synthesizing, we learn that the opposition is expressed in the following terms:

Curtin: Modernizers (westernizers, utopian modernizers, neo-traditionalists)/Traditionalists (common conservative, utopian reactionaries, defensive modernizers)

Górski: Westernizers/National identity

Esenbel: Benefit from modern achievements/Preserve native cultures

Hunter: fundamentalists/westernizers (synthesis), and in addition, innovative revolutionaries

Jedlicki: Native traditions defenders/imported modernity supporters

Mahjoubi: Supporters of modernism /Non-supporters

Toynbee: Herodians/Zealots

Zea: Awareness of dependence and marginalization/Dream of becoming the West

Zhan: Western "universalist" modernity/"Alternative" modernity[4]

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[4]**Nuances in the dilemma.** This point of view, which tends to establish patterns more or less universal

As can be seen, different authors have exceeded the regions they study by attempting comparisons and synthesis that come close to the formulation of "peripheral" thinking. By gathering a characterization that is repeated, the intention is to improve this formulation with reference to the center, which almost goes unmentioned by authors who have studied the different Geo-cultural regions, except in the case of the polish writer E. Gorski.

He argues, following in good measure his teacher Leopoldo Zea, that "we will use the adjective peripheral in a descriptive but not evaluative sense, emphasizing, therefore, the deeper significance of the philosophical thought in the periphery, and especially the effort to think precisely from the point of view of the periphery (Górski 1994, 10).

The peripheral dilemma relies on certain background information or is modulated according to cultures. But its novelty lies in the fact that it is incomprehensible without a reference to the center, either as an imitative desire, or as an eager differentiator. That is why this dilemma is not equivalent to modern/traditional perspectives that occurs in central societies, or to an opposition between innovators and conservatives or traditionalists. In societies that perceived themselves as central, those who claim tradition (traditionalists) are conservative or reactionary; in societies which perceived themselves as peripheral, those who claim identity (identitarian) can be progressive at the same time (and they often are).

What I have tried to do from these bases is conduct empirical research to test hypotheses other people had presented, both in the Geo-cultural sense as well as a historical sense. However, this takes place without sufficient substantiation in order to expand the territories and intellectual times for all (or almost all) of the peripheral world between the 18th century and the beginning of the 21st. However, the increase in empirical information cannot be separated from the expansion and formulation of the paradigm that allows us to understand it and, at the same time, tune a theoretical instrumental for these effects. But in addition to this, I think it is key

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for the peripheral world, does not prevent, on the other hand, these same authors or others from establishing nuances, differentiating some cases from others. Jedlicki, for example, argues that in Poland this conflict never acquired the expression so radical as it was in Russia or Turkey or in some more distant Asian countries. "Apart from some jealous Slavophiles, who dreamed of the resurrection of some form of a popular, patriarchal proto-Slavic system, nobody really wanted Poland to be disconnected from the West or in regard to their thinking and technology. At the same time, nobody was looking for the Polish people to become Europeanized to such an extent that it obscured the particular features and their historical heritage, including their language" (1999, 25-26).

to undertake a reflection about the intellectual conditions (relating to the matter of knowledge, eidetic systems and intellectual cultures of the periphery) that can help overcome a way of thinking that has been transformed into a straitjacket by moving toward the overcoming of the peripheral condition itself.

5. Appearing conditions of the peripheral thinking: a feeling of inferiority-vulnerability and a sufficiently "rationalist" type of thought.

The emergence of the peripheral dilemma and peripheral reasons—in various regions with low reciprocal communication—can only be explained by the repetition of conditions that, among other things, point to the repetition of a type of sensitivity that is generated in intellectuals after the European presence and that inspires (such as breeding grounds) peripheral thinking.

To understand the origins of the peripheral mindset as modern thought and referred to the center (whether in the identitarian or centralitarian position), it is key to understand the sensibility that comes before it. This sensibility is particularly important because peripheral thinking originates more from "provocation" or "fertilization" than influence; that is to say, it originates more as a product of a sensibility than from the reception of intellectual influences from abroad, although the causes of its emergence must be distinguished as well as the causes of its development. In fact, the mindset that appeared in a peripheral region, because of its own peripheral condition, is poorly disseminated and little recognized beyond its borders, unlike the thought of the center, which has the best sounding board and the best channels of dissemination. When we say that peripheral thinking originates from "provocation," we mean that the insolent presence of the center unsettles the peripheral intelligentsia, from which numerous "peripheral motives" appear, as was the case, for example, with the results of the invasions of Napoleon in the mentality of Egypt, Russia, Spain and Spanish America. In these places these motives emerged or were developed in parallel and independently (spontaneously), to the extent that there was no influence, nor intellectual communication, except among the last two cases. The violent provocation —invasion— and the simple peaceful provocation—through trade, expeditions, travelers' reports and demonstration effects— created a reprocessing and reinterpretation of some ideas available within the intelligentsia of the peripheral regions, from which the development

of a peripheral thinking began to appear.

When I started this research, I thought about the spontaneous generation of the peripheral thinking. Given the conditions of European expansion there was a polarization of the intelligentsia between a centralitarian group and an identitarian group. When I found out more about the circulation of ideas between the center and the periphery and among the various peripheral regions, it was obvious that the reciprocal influences were much more than I initially imagined, although on many occasions the peripheral circulation of ideas happens through the center. For example, Sarmiento's centralitarian ideas did not seem to have been known by Russians nor Arabs; however, Sarmiento quoted Mohamed Ali, although subsequent to the publication of *Facundo*. Where had he gotten that information from? From the *Revue des deux mondes*, perhaps? Did he know about the figure of Mohamed Ali and/or of Peter the Great before writing *Facundo*? On the other hand, Mohamed Ali knew of Peter the Great. The ideas of Peter the Great came to Mohamed Ali through the biography written by Voltaire. The same did not occur with Muteferrika, who knew of the case of Peter firsthand. The influence of Herder and other German romantics has been key for identitarian thinking and we know that several of them knew of this German author's work first or second hand and that, therefore, their identitarian proposals did not purely appear spontaneously.

Sensibility is an intermediate reality between the "contextual" and the "eidetic;" it is a pre-eidetic reality, semi-psychological, of a very basic reaction when facing events that have not been sufficiently processed. The sensibility that is configured on the peripheries after the presence of the European powers is defined by a mixture of semi-psychological and semi-eidetic elements, and by a collective mental state where "feelings" such as defiance and impotence or a sense of vulnerability join with feelings of pain and curiosity. These feelings come about either through invasion and/or due to the simple awareness of blatant superiority; they also arise due to humiliation brought on by a disqualifying speech, fascination with power and strength, rejection of a mode of being different, bewilderment about the abandonment of tutelary deities, and finally, feelings of surprise and admiration. The notion of "sensibility" is specifically mentioned here as something connected, although it is previous to ideas. Within this notion of sensibility, as in a culture medium, these ideas merge and develop. This sensibility operates as a kind of catalyst that makes all the elements present in the schools of thought within that scenario—both indigenous, or

earlier ones, as well as the ones which have recently emerged from the center— shape the peripheral dilemma: this is a new way of formulating problems and organizing the intellectual field, ways that did not exist neither in indigenous societies—now peripheral— nor in Europe, now the center.

A number of people who have studied the mindset within the peripheral regions (Abdallah Laroui 1997, 236; Isaiah Berlin 1993, 238; Leopoldo Zea 1993, 289 et seqs; Angus Stewart, Ana Silak 2001, 335; Gerard Chaliand 1979, 28 et seqs; Sugiyama, 1994; 28, and Leonard Schapiro 1967, 29) as well as the protagonists of these regions' mindset (such as D. F. Sarmiento, Liang Qichao, Hassan Al-Banna, quoted by Ramadan 2000, 211, Frantz Fanon, Nishi Amane, quoted by Sugiyama T. 1994, 20) have presented analysis or testimonials regarding the psycho-social, cultural, and other conditions that have served as the basis, the foundation, or the environment favorable to the rise of a peripheral thinking, which is an organism that lives, grows and thrives on that ground.

Referring to his arrival in Europe, the Argentinean writer D. F. Sarmiento wrote the following: "My heart pounded as we moved closer to land, and my hands ran without meditation through the buttons of my suit, stretching the Frock coat, touching the knot of the tie, straightening the shirt bottlenecks, such as when the inexperienced lover is going to be introduced to the ladies" (2004, 27). By that time, the Russian writer A. Herzen, wrote: "No one has yet highlighted the extraordinary and eccentric position of a Russian in western countries, especially when that Russian ceases to be a mere curious person. Our position in our own country is terrible. Our eyes are always turned toward the door…" He adds that "traveling abroad is the desire of every proper man. We need to see, to touch with our hands the world we only know through reading…The Russian moves across the border drunk with joy. It is in vain that we try to give our face the strokes of the elderly, it is in vain that we use an old habit that remains too tight, the habit sooner or later is torn and the barbarian appears with his chest out, blushing for not knowing how to wear foreign garments… Europe can perceive a bitter reproach in the eyes of a Russian; she sees in them a surprise, insulting to her, that replaces the naïve admiration of the first day" (1912, 234-235). Something similar happened with the Meirokusha in Japan. Nishi Amane, one of the members of the Meirokusha, argued: "In the old days, before the Meiji Restoration, in our conversations among friends, we often made comparisons with European countries about how much we envied them and how sorry we were of our own ignorance. Finally, after concluding that

nothing could be done about the ignorance of our people, we could only sigh deeply" (Quoted in Sugiyama 1994, 20). The Egyptian writer H. Al-Banna, referring to his sentiment in the 1920s, confessed: "I felt overwhelmed by the large concerns of seeing the social life of the Egyptian nation, so dear to me, wavering between Islam— full of values that I had inherited, protected and fed and with which I had lived and with which Egypt had become enriched during 14 centuries—and the powerful western invasion, armed and equipped with all of the weapons of destruction, such as money and prestige, beautiful appearances and pleasures, force and the media. This inspired within me a feeling of such intensity that was transmitted to my fellow students of Al-Azhar, Dar Al-Ulum and other institutions" (Quoted by Ramadan 2000, 211). The Senegalese novelist Cheikh Hamidou Kane, in his work *The ambiguous adventure,* describes it in the following manner: Our grandfather and all his elite were defeated. Why? How? Only newcomers know that. We need to ask them; we have to go with them to learn the art of winning without being right (2006, 48).

Several studies on thinking and culture have also referred to this sensibility, this psycho-existential situation of the peripheral intelligentsia that motivates the emergence of peripheral thinking.

Inspired by a text of Simón Bolívar, in which he refers to Latin Americans as "Americans by birth and European by rights," he adds: "we found ourselves in the conflict of disputing the titles of possession with the natives and keeping ourselves in the country where we were born, against the opposition of the invaders." Leopoldo Zea (1977, 4) reflects that "the Latin American is an expression and a result of the juxtaposition imposed within which he will feel uncomfortable; uncomfortable the same way in relation with the paternal crowd, as in relation with the maternal crowd. Rejected by one, he'll be ashamed to be part of the other. He is a man who begins to accept the criteria of the colonizer on the maternal and American culture and, according to them, he accepts the inferiority of his miscegenation, which prevents him from being part of the legitimate paternal culture. His miscegenation, far from being something positive, will be the source of all his ambiguity and ambivalence… An inferiority complex or bastardy complex arises, which time and time again will prevent the cultural assumption of his opposite way of being, the definition of his identity".

With regard to the Russians, Ana Siljak (2001, 335 et seqs) writes: "After the reign of Peter, the educated Russians, to the extent that they came to be increasingly aware of western culture, experienced their first aches of envy and insecurity in the face of

what they perceived as the European superiority." For his part, Isaiah Berlin (1993, 238) suggests that "the true (Russian) intelligentsia was born in the 19th century, when, following the Napoleonic invasion, Russian officials came to Paris and were impressed by a society which, compared to theirs, was perceived as liberal and enlightened. It was then that foreign ideas started to enter Russia in growing force."

Abdallah Laroui (1997, 236) reproduces both the testimonies of some Ambassadors of Morocco who visited Europe around 1900 and the impact the inventions caused them. He notes that some "did not conceal their admiration for technical inventions, and often refer to amazing, wonderful and incredible facts." Others, such as "Ibn Idris, the most detailed when describing these inventions, despite the great difficulties of terminology, only sees in the perfection of the inventions of the Europeans the announcing signal of their imminent decline".

Anne Cheng (1997, 578) states that the Chinese, confronted with another scheme of world organization, were forced to admit that their country not only wasn't the center of the world, but only a nation just like those that had been founded in Europe. For his part, Tang (1996,2), referring to Liang Qichao, points out that his image of the world changed with the explosive impact of the global space as a geographical and political reality that patents the limitations of the old and parish image of the world. The new image changed the identity of Liang and China, which had to rethink themselves in view of this new situation, while inserted in a global space and time, not subjected to the rationality that conceived the centrality of China.

Gerard Chaliand argues that "during the course of the contemporary era, few historical phenomena have had a nature as de-structuring and traumatic as colonial domination" (1979, 28). The effects of the colonial domination "on the psychological plane are considerable. Everywhere, although particularly in the nations of ancient formations: In China, Egypt, Vietnam, and Persia, the traditional elites have suffered, in their confusion, the irresistible decay of Europe" (1979, 29). "Among certain urban layers, the colonial trauma is felt more keenly. Before raising our heads, turning occasionally to revolts or participating directly or not in the national liberation, the colonized, both in Asia and Africa, is first and foremost a being that, dominated by the white, feels bad about himself. He subjects himself—most often unconsciously— to the values of the white colonizer: shame, feelings of inferiority, and humiliation characterize it. To the extent that his condition allows it,

he tries to imitate the colonizer or adopt anywhere possible their standards and language; this is a vain task because his skin color betrays him. The urban colonized man belonging to a certain social level is at the same time attracted to the white world that embodies his servitude to an order that is not his, but to which no evasion is possible" (1979, 30).

In summary, some strokes that allow us to define the situation that originates and facilitates the development of the peripheral thinking can be established. In an analytical effort, one can distinguish numerous elements that, in reality, overlap each other and are not together in all situations. Sarmiento shows a kind of insecurity similar to that of the inexperienced lover who is going to be introduced to the ladies; Herzen, portraying the barbaric who blushes for not knowing how to wear foreign garments; Nishi Amane, recalling the sighs of envy because of their ignorance; and Hassan Al Banna, feeling overwhelmed by the powerful western invasion, armed and provided with all of the ancient weapons of destruction. L. Zea, synthesizing the feeling of the Latin-American discomfort, as well as the relation to the paternal and maternal people, resulting in a complex of inferiority or of bastardy; Ana Siljak, stressing that educated Russians experienced their first headaches of envy and insecurity in the face of what they perceived as European superiority; Abdallah Laroui, portraying the feeling of some Ambassadors of Morocco who could not hide their admiration for the technical inventions, those amazing facts, wonderful and unbelievable. Anne Cheng, even more radical, highlights that the Chinese were forced to admit that their country was not only not the totality of the world, it was not even the center of it; this was endorsed by Xiaobing Tang who, referring to Liang Qichao, points out that his image of the world changed, because the limitations of the old and parish image of China became patent; and G. Chaliand, talks about the colonized man, a person who is subjected to the values of the white colonizer, with that known shame, his feeling of inferiority and humiliation that characterize him.

Such sensibility, where there are mixed feelings of vulnerability and/or humiliation, shame, admiration, removal, precariousness, inferiority, insecurity, jealousy, impotence, is the permanent companion and land of cultivation for peripheral thinking. In this regard, the peripheral mindset is part of a larger set composed, among other aspects, of that "upset" sensibility that is developed within the intellectual environment (mainly educated) that knowing the presence and the power of the center, suffers a very radical modification of their way of feeling and understanding

of the world. Now, if we give a general outline of this, in societies in which western expansion takes place, there are two elites: one that is more "internationalized," which accepts the presence of that presence-invasion, and one that is less "internationalized," often within interior regions of the territories, which don't notice such a thing (or is not aware of it in intellectual terms) and continues to carry their same ancestral beliefs without assuming this new phenomenon and this new condition. The first of these elites is of interest to this effect since it often travels to central regions, communicates with the elites of the center, knows a bit of the intellectual production of the center and knows, at least rudimentarily, a few languages of the center. This is one of the best breeding grounds for "peripheral sensibility." This sensibility is a kind of cultural inferiority complex that faces several findings: the power of the center, the inventiveness of its culture, the magnificence of its buildings, and the efficiency of their actions (the military capacity or the beauty of Paris) are the elements that astonish the intelligentsia of the periphery. This sensibility generates two responses: one of fascination and one of rejection, but both are based on astonishment, the feeling of smallness and/or inability, and impotence; they are also based on the feeling of having been overcome and defeated.

6.   Historical development of peripheral thinking.

The intelligentsia of various regions assumed this peripheral perspective of **thinking in relation to the center**, whether in the prospect of being-like-it or of being-different-from-it. Some of the most characteristic authors have been chosen in order to paradigmatically show these positions in the last three centuries. Both the centralitarian and identitarian positions will be progressively constituting themselves along the way, to the extent that they produce different approaches from the so-called "proto-peripheral," which announces the dilemma but fails to formulate it fully. The Intelligentsia of various places create similar ideas to this regard in a parallel manner and quite independently, although on occasions they also share reciprocal influences. Turkish and Ottoman, Russian, Polish, Japanese, Spanish and Latin American intellectuals, in general, get closer to these formulations.

Chapter I refers to the manifestations of the mindset that announce the peripheral dilemma and its first formulations, covering, *grosso modo*, the 18th century and the first two decades of

the 19th century. The formulation of the dilemma be-like-the-center versus be-ourselves did not reach its full manifestation in the intelligentsia of every region. It will be displayed how such insinuations were formulated in relation to the circulation of ideas and influences between certain peripheral regions. It will also be displayed how this happened in different regions of the world, in relation to the prestige and presence of European expansion, without this being given at once, because the action of the center was mutating and renewing.

In chapter II, which covers the period from 1820 to 1870 approximately, we can still see proto formulations among some intellectuals, although in this period we can perceive the maturation in every part of the dilemma. The decade of the 1820s has been set as the beginning of this period, with the ending of the enlightened thinking and the start of the romantic thinking, which in Latin America is associated with the construction of nation-states; in Russia and the Slavic world, with the establishment of the classical controversy between westernizers and Slavophiles, also with the foundation of the Brahmo-Samaj and the young Bengal in India, as well as with the foundation of the Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone and the installation of a certain black intelligentsia of Afro-descendants in Liberia. It is also associated with shipments of Egyptian and Ottoman students to Europe. The period 1870-1880 ended with the massive influx of positivism, the presence of the mature thinking of the "Saros" and Blyden's in Africa, the appearance of Islamic revivalism in Islamic regions, the work of Young Ottomans, Japanese Meriokusha and the renewal of Chinese thinking, and the appearance of the independence movement in the Philippines. The time of closure is clearer than the time of the beginning. The creation of networks of peripheral intellectuals, especially in Paris, is very relevant. In Paris, people from Slavic regions, Balkan regions (whether Ottoman or not), Ibero-American and other places converge; it's relevant to mention that this convergence also happened in other major cities of Europe.

In Chapter III, between 1870 and 1915, that is to say, between the beginning of positivism in the peripheries and social Darwinism until the radical questioning or exhaustion of such positions—a product of the intellectual earthquake caused by the Global War—, we can see a display of Pan-Asianism, as well as centralitarian formulations in Japan and the *sub*-Saharan Africa. We can also see identitarian formulations in Africa and Islamic regions, as well as expressions of Eurasianism, which was in part a projection of the controversy between Slavophilia and Occidentalism.

In chapter IV (1915 and 1950), which comprises the period of wars and between wars, we found expressions of Identitarism and conservative Centralitarism which go back after World War I, and their progressive versions widely related to the independence movements of the colonized world.

In chapter V (1950 and 1990), we approach the start of economic and social sciences, the decline of essayistic-political thinking, the construction of independent nation-states, socialist formulations of varied topics, and up until the moment the discussions on globalization began. The appearance and development of the economic and social sciences in peripheral regions is shown, as well as the centralitarian positions related to development theories, a criticism of Dependentism, and the appearance of the Liberationism movement and Neoliberalism.

Chapter VI deals with what has happened with thinking in the peripheral regions "toward 2000." The big problem between 1990 and 2010 was not the end of the Cold War, but the discussions on globalization and identities, discussions in which the peripheral dilemma was present 3 centuries after being created. The ways in which the basic structures of the dilemma are reiterated is highlighted, although now they are related to topics such as the school of subalternity, cultural studies, post-colonial theories, the subject of Eurocentrism and, particularly, the ways to guard, devise, cope with, adapt…or, however you may call it, to globalization, which is the most universal problem toward 2000, and that many understand as a projection or a step further of European expansion. In this period, the discussions were structured with others on how to visualize better societies without already having socialist formulations as references, which were key 40 or 50 years earlier; also, there were discussion on how to account for cultural dimensions that manifested with effervescence decades after independence.

7.   The "motives" of peripheral thinking.

"Motives of peripheral thinking" is the name given to those recurring arguments that appear in various peripheral intelligentsias seeking to defend, claim or assert some dimension of their reality of denigrating arguments coming from the center. These motives try to respond to the disqualifications, and particularly to the clichés that the peripheral intelligentsia itself build with regard to the speech of the center, which states that the people, nature, or culture of the peripheries have less weight than the center, and

therefore, they are inferior.

It is about ideas that constitute peripheral thinking. They are judgments that relate the central and peripheral world in terms of comparison, alluding to benefits or potentiality. It should be noted that these reasons, important in peripheral thinking, are explained precisely by the feeling of perplexity-inferiority which pervades the intelligentsia. The disqualifications stated by the center are particularly painful. The insecure peripheral intellectuals get tired and exhausted trying to show that it is all falsehood. In an inversely proportional way, this can be compared with the relatively minor importance the intellectuals of the center give to the multiple disqualifications sent from the periphery. The center, because they don't suffer a deficit during comparison, do not listen nor give importance to a speech which sounds like noisiness and doesn't challenge them.

Although they intersect and overlap each other in their argument, motives can be divided into 3 types, detailed in specific sentences: the basics, the centralitarian and the identitarian.

The basics are the ones that widely react against the center's disqualifications, being the main and most paradigmatic motive to argue against the loss of credit, slander, and the wrong version — a version interested and related to domination. Figures such as the Inca Garcilaso, John Paul Forner, Xavier Clavijero, Bankimchandra, James A. Horton, Jose Rizal, C. A. Diop and Edward Said, among others, have been relevant in this work.

Centralitarian motives are articulated on the idea that the region itself must be placed at the level of the center and must act as "civilized" as the center. On the basis of this criterion the following motives are formulated: our culture is compatible with modernity, our culture has moved in the same direction as the center, and our culture is part of the center. Figures such as the Inca Garcilaso, Namık Kemal, and Juan Bautista Alberdi, have thought this way.

Up to this point, I have presented the motives of defense and vindication. If the best defense is the attack, numerous intellectual figures of the periphery have wanted to reverse the disqualifications received from the center with reciprocal motives.

Identitarian motives, for their part, are articulated around the idea that their (own) periphery is not inferior, but different from the center, which on many occasions is even superior and might even save the center. It has been stated that notions such as culture, and particularly the spirituality of the region (not of the entire periphery) is greater than that of the center; it has also been stated that the region has made great contributions to humanity, the

culture of the region is older than the center and, even, that it is the source of the center. Authors such as Ch. A. Diop, Gandhi, P. D. Boilat, Charles Marke, Bankimchandra, Afghani, Namik Kemal, Mohammed Abdu, Abdul-Baha, Farid Maruf, Sun Yat-Sen, Mustafa Kemal, and Petr Mikhailovich Bitsilli have contributed to these ideas, as well as Akyigitzade Musa, G. A. Nasser, Ivan Kireevskii and Alexei Jomiakov, Keshab Chandra Sen, Muhammad Iqbal, José E. Rodó, A. Mickiewicz, Vivekananda and Aurobindo, N. Trubetskoy, José Vasconcelos and Luis Valcárcel.

8. Denials and improvements of peripheral thinking

It seems of the utmost importance, as it has already been hinted, to articulate peripheral thinking with the past/future dimension of the peripheral regions. The detection of a common pattern, present in the works of intellectuals from numerous peripheral societies, has led us to the formulation of a type of thinking (of quandary) that would define (it would constitute) the peripherality of a mindset or thinking. This, however, and this is equally evident, does not cover (or does not exhaust) the eidetic manifestations of a peripheral society.

Other options are still present that, in some way, escape from the fundamental dilemma and don't get caught by it. There are two complementary challenges: First, to imagine a different and more comprehensive formulation that is able to also consider those dilemmas that are beyond the formulation we have presented and then show that this is not the most comprehensive formulation, but that there is another one that allows the inclusion of elements that this formulation does not reach; the second challenge is to show the existence of escape points from the peripheral dilemma as it has been formulated in order to flee the prison that it implies for the intelligentsia. This prison is like the air: it has allowed them to fly, but it is a resistance that makes it difficult to reach other levels that transcend the atmosphere of the peripheral condition.

To think from the periphery is to think in relation to an otherness. The otherness of the center is to think in a different way and also to think in order to leave the peripheral condition (which is a kind of exile in history) in order to be placed in some centrality which offers the possibility of abandoning that condition of pariahs of history. To think from the otherness is to think about other forms of emancipation, understood as ways to leave the state of marginalization so as to be set in a place of equality in the global space. The peripheral condition is an awareness and a fact, to put it

in a sort of sketchy way. This work is about the "constitution" of such consciousness: the ways in which the intellectual agents of the peripheries started to accept an eidetic position with respect to their place in the world. This narrative aims to lead, then, toward the remembrance of the process of constitution of that consciousness.

A key element in the constitution of the peripheral awareness is the notion of the difference with respect to the center. The idea of "different peoples," in regard to those Europeans who showed the power of their expansion, was early. In this process of constituting an awareness of the periphery there are at least two moments: in one, the image of a society is built, moving from the ancestral "naïve" vision of being the center-of-the-world toward the new notion of periphery-in-respect-of-a-new-center; there is another one, where the image of the difference is constituted. Notions such as "colonial regions," "non-European" regions, and "not belonging to Christianity" are some of the proto conceptions that contribute, from the center, to giving rise to such an idea. But these notions, which are not mainly economic, acquired a more economic tone gradually, undertaking aspects that were not in the proto-conceptions and leaving aside others that were key there, such as having a religion, for example. Thus, notions such as "third-world," "South," "poor countries," "periphery" try to characterize a majority and unprivileged part of humanity, at least in terms of economy and power.

Now, it is essential to carry out the critique of the peripheral motive and its numerous peripheral vices, which are not the same vices that any intelligentsia in the times and spaces can incur, but specific vices, which have to do particularly with the peripheral condition and with limitations or consequences of the peripheral dilemma itself. In summary, the two greatest vices with which others articulate are the following: for the centralitarian it is the vice of intellectual laziness, of avoiding thinking in a specific way and uncritically assuming that what worked in a place could equally work in others under any type of conditions. This has led to a referral practice, that, because it is not the subject of this volume, is barely mentioned: the culture of "theatrical background." That is to say, that an adornment of modernity is built without depth or thickness, where the appearances of what is western-modern seem to suffice, without taken them as part of a process that involves, *grosso modo*, the whole of society during a long process.

In regard to identitarian space, the matrix vice is to imagine that it is enough to be autochthonous or original to succeed, getting rid dependencies in order to build free and better societies. They

suffer from a strong weakness: it has normally been inspired by authors from the center and it avoids questioning the results of its actions according to valid comparisons, hiding behind what is its own, thus justifying oppression, inequality and failures, among other things.

It should be noted that there is still a third matrix vice, and that it doesn't properly belong to centralitarian or identitarian separately; it belongs both of them, to the extent that they limit themselves to thinking within the framework of the dilemma. That is to say, by thinking within the framework of this dilemma they blocked the possibility of thinking about other possible ways, thereby transforming what was a springboard into a straitjacket.

On the other hand, there are equally specific strengths that seek to be capitalized and promoted in order to improve and overcome peripheral thinking and emerge from the peripheral condition itself. It should be noted that there is also a trajectory within the peripheral regions in order to overcome this dilemma. That is to say, some strengths and potentials of peripheral thought shall be considered that allow the vices or weaknesses noted above to be overcome by working with/on them. The first observation that can be made in the search for overcoming lines is that many people have wanted to renounce both options—the identitarian and the centralitarian positions—by seeking equilibrium points, which means, in a sense, denying them, even if only in one direction: the claim that one of the poles of the dilemma is the more or less explicit critic of the other pole. The search for equilibrium points through criticism of the extreme positions is, in a way, the criticism of the dilemma composed of poles. The second observation is that in the peripheries there are eidetic lines that have denied the idea that reality is thought or should be thought of in terms of the peripheral dilemma, maintaining that there are other criteria for understanding reality.

The work concludes with a number of proposals for the thinking and the intelligentsia of the peripheral regions, taking the capitalization of existing strengths as a basis. Such proposals are expressed around intellectual networks, the empowerment of the professions of knowledge and their relevance in the global space. Furthermore, the topic of good thinking in/from the peripheries, and the contribution of a theoretical framework that facilitates thinking of the world from the periphery imports a global perspective rather than a political or analog perspective to the forms of management of modern nation-states. In this connection, a proposal for a global progressivism imagined from the periphery is submitted in order to put an end to the peripheral condition without

imagining a future which is closed in a dogmatic and authorizing manner (utopianism of Thomas More), but rather focused on the opening of thought.

9.   The importance of the notes and annexes.

A project that aims to cover such a large number of authors, regions, eras and schools of thought could not fail to be accompanied by a set of instruments to facilitate their reading. These aggregates, while facilitators, intend to be the highlight of numerous veins or tracks which guide those wishing to investigate these issues.

Usually, authors are quoted verbatim and in a more or less extensive way. By doing this, I have intended to transmit their own words, something that is achievable through translations and time. But, at the same time, there was a rapprochement intent between these people, as it would have been impossible to deliver in my own words reliable versions of the works of hundreds and hundreds of selected authors.

An exception can be seen with Latin American thinking, which is more familiar to me, where I move with more fluidity and where it is possible, therefore, to offer synthesis and make judgments without so many textual references.

The biography is limited to the works cited in this book and are only ordered by alphabetical order. Following the same criterion that has been used for notes, I didn't want to overload the work with a supplementary, uncited bibliography, as it would be an almost infinite task. Nor have I wanted to comment on the works cited, because without any comments, they already cover tens of pages. The quoting criterion within the text is the most conventional in the scientific system: (Last name, year, page). If any person has two works the same year, they have been ordered with a, b... A lot of the bibliography comes from the Internet, the page from which we got it is always indicated and, if possible, the paper edition where it can be found. The bibliography is always referred to in the language in which it was used. The quotes in the Spanish version of this book are my own translations.

The book ends with an **index** of authors, schools of thought, institutions, geographic locations and other informative aspects. There is also a list of **acronyms** attached of the above-mentioned institutions.

The **notes** are eminently of erudition and they pursue three objectives: to provide supplementary information, draw parallels

between different regions, people, and periods (which, in my opinion, are very much unknown to those who make eidetic studies on specific areas), and to suggest lines of research that may be useful, especially for young people who want to deepen and eventually carry out investigations in little, or not at all, discussed areas. As a result, the notes are aimed at those who have an interest in eidetic studies (aspiring to stiffen in the erudition, in the theories and methodologies of the discipline) and not so much at those who simply want to learn more about peripheral thinking. A portion of these notes has already appeared in my book on *sud*-Saharan African thinking, several of them having been corrected and augmented. In any case, I did not want to weigh down the text with notes that I've found interesting for the objectives of this work. I did not want to write expert notes on biographical issues or regarding translations, and even less overload the text with philosophical or expert considerations that serve more those who write to show off, than illustrate those who read them.

On **cartographies**, I must say that it is essential to create and publicize road maps that show the reliefs of the peripheral intelligentsia, and that, at least, express two things: what the networks that existed during key moments were, and who the most important people in the dissemination of ideas were. Without this, it is almost impossible to understand the circulation. Two types of mappings are presented here: I**nfluences** (emission or reception) and **networks**.

The project **Atlas del Pensamiento** (Atlas of thought) gathers and connects multiple information, and it was simultaneously created with this book. Assuming the need for "industrial" intellectual production, it has been decided to upload a great amount of "incidental" pieces to the internet, so that we do not have to incorporate them to each work, especially if it is going to be published on paper. In **Atlas del Pensamiento** thousands of other information and connections, for those who wish to delve into these issues, can be found. The project, as its name suggests, aims to geographically exhibit the way of thinking in the peripheral regions, particularly during the last 3 centuries. It is true that any encyclopedia would suffice to reach lots of people, schools, institutions, etc., but **Atlas** has been designed specifically for this, and those whoever needs more information than the succinct amount provided in this database will be able to have access to all other sources of information. **Atlas** is able to make specific relationships and automatic connections that other projects of erudition are not capable of doing. In this case, we have truly

reached into the resources of the artificial intelligence and it is not simply an online encyclopedia, as it will indicate when visiting it. On the other hand, huge amounts of information, especially about biographical data, events and organizations, have been taken from a number of encyclopedias, in particular from Wikipedia, a project that had been very beneficial for me and whose innovative system seems to me to be honest and grower.

10. The limitations of this work.

The limitations of this work, from other viewpoints, will be plenty, so it will be up to other people to point them out, although there are also deficiencies from the point of view of who has written it. There are deficiencies stemming from the inability, at least for this first edition, to incorporate peripheral regions that have been so for at least during some eras, particularly Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US-America. Therefore, the conclusions and the scope of the thesis fail to incorporate the thinking of these places and, for the time being, it is just like a hypothesis where we can read the works generated in certain eras. Perhaps a new edition could incorporate any of such absences.

There are difficulties that come from the lot of time invested and the obligations imposed by systems of research and teaching. In fact, I have worked on this work specifically for about 10 years and, within the framework of different projects, I have published a set of articles and even books that correspond to partial advances. Several of these articles and books have attempted to merge into this larger project. It should be understood, however, that they have not always been able to melt completely well, since their specific rationality forced them to move through particular paths that were not always one hundred percent consistent with those of the larger project that gave them meaning. In any case, it is my conviction that in the end, these demands are incentives, without which we would possibly have to wait for research progress for way too long.

More important difficulties come from the limitations in knowledge of languages and the consequent difficulties of accessing many areas of production. Among the most relevant of these deficiencies we can find the Chinese thinking of the 20th century and the thinking of the peoples of Eastern Europe—very little of which is translated into the languages that I manage. The cited literature comes, therefore, only from works in Catalan, Spanish, French, Galician, English, Italian and Portuguese, which are the few

languages that I can manage to read. The Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, Turkish and Urdu languages would have been very useful for this effect. In addition, I believe languages of importance to this effect would also be the Afrikaner, German, Hindi and Polish languages, among others, no doubt.

There are weaknesses that stem not only from the inability to read many indigenous languages, but the eventual error of perspective to which it may lead. The fact of reading few sources and many works about the authors, and above all, works made by authors from the center, perhaps has led me to accept the perspective of those works, which precisely divide the thinking of the peripheral regions between the identitarian and the centralitarian perspectives. This could be the main deficiency, which would come from a fundamental error of view and that could lead to having built a wrong thesis. I have the consolation that knowledge advances with many provocative mistakes that other people shall amend. It would have been impossible to amend them if a thesis on the thinking of peripheral regions, after European expansion, had not been formulated; that is to say, on the intelligentsia of many peoples over the centuries.

11. To finish with the introduction but not closing the book.

Do I have to say that I pine for a philosophy of history, or that I need it? How do we think of this whole movement of ideas that involves approximately 80% of humanity without finding it, giving it or forcing a meaning upon it in which the alleged figures of the peripheral awareness can connect, join, organize, empower, and converge into a great and magnificent absolute, where all the miseries, trifles, exploitation, and marginality would be resolved along with other baseness of our poor periphery, full with abandoned and malnourished children?

Unfortunately, there isn't still a philosophy of history, there is no meaning, nor there is any dialectic of an absolute spirit and that is why there is a periphery. Because there is no absolute spirit that can save us and because we are abandoned to the ups and downs of history and, therefore, compelled to think better, to think well or to continue dying, at the edges of the precipice of abundance.

I would like to be able to show—or to naively and credulously invent, at least—how everything will be organized so that we may find ourselves in higher instances of the necessary movement of peoples, classes, states, confederations, continents, ethnicities, and, above all, ideas that should be of justice and of building justice.

Ideas to build well-being, freedom, balance, democracy and respect, particularly that context, that good sense of doing things right for the good of the majorities, for the good of all of us.

There is unfortunately no Hegel nor are there other lies that the Center could tell itself or to us. A Hegel from the periphery would be similar to a cheesy Hegel that would show a strong stand on an issue but later would contradict himself, or as we say in Chile, would "erase with his elbow what he was hand writing" on the sly, thus turning his back on all the absurdity of reality.

However, I find a small consolation in being able to show some movements in which the unfolding of the dialectic of the global peripheral regions, seen with "goodwill", can even sound like "progress," in a kind of modest positivist Hegelianism. The movements are: (i) the existence of great similarities in the speeches of the peripheral intellectuals, along with the detection of numerous "meeting points" that can facilitate dialog and understanding; (ii) the growth of networks and of the subsequent relations among peripheral intellectuals and, in this connection, their causes and consequences, (iii) the growth of the awareness of the periphery status as "peripheral condition."

The dialectic between *in-itself* and *for-itself* could (and should, if the world were rational) lead to overcoming *(aufgehoben)* our own peripheral dilemma. To overcome this, as negation of the negation, which would be the denial the peripheral thinking makes regarding the role of the center, would lead to a situation in which peripheral thought would be transformed dialectically, "un-peripheralizing" and carried out, in the thinking of a more sensible and fair humanity. But this is no longer part of eidetic studies but an eidology-fiction.

In this regard, one possibility is to embrace Leopoldo Zea's proposal, with his "un-provincialized" Hegelianism, where a secular, undertaking project of intellectuals and cultures, overrides the aufhebung of the absolute spirit. In this scheme, there is not even a necessary movement toward a synthesis (in the manner of José Vasconcelos, who was pulling someone's chestnuts out of the fire), because nothing can guarantee a sort of "salvation," even that less mystique solution of hoping that someday we will master the rest of the people or even that we will contribute with all our talents to humanity (as Edward Blyden hoped and his disciples expect, in the hope that what African peoples were unable to conquer by themselves would come from Providence). However, we cannot even ensure that at some point the history of the world will be interested in our contributions, and much less that these

contributions will have their seven minutes of fame and prominence that so many peripheral intellectuals dream about.